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Protection and Enforcement of Well-Known Mark 
Rights in China: History, Theory and Future 
By Jing “Brad” Luo* & Shubha Ghosh** 
¶1 As the People’s Republic of China1 plays an ever more important role in global 
trade and commerce,2 its stance on the protection of intellectual property has been under 
increasing scrutiny from countries around the world.3  Concerns about China’s 
intellectual property rights (“IPR”) protection arise not only from individual rights-
holders,4 but also from sovereign nations.  China’s protection of well-known marks with 
respect to private owners is the primary focus of this note, but a discussion about 
sovereign nations’ challenge of China’s fulfillment of its WTO commitment regarding 
IPR is beyond the scope. 
¶2 Private rights-holders are uneasy about China’s record of IPR protection, to say the 
least.  Many hold the view that China has a relatively weak IPR protection system that 
does not provide adequate protection to them.5  This view, irrespective of its merits, is 
based in part on facts; it is also based in part on the fear of the unknown.  Like the rest of 
the developed countries, where right-holders enjoy better protection, China is in the 
process of building an ever-evolving regime for the protection of IPR.  The evolution of 
an IPR protection regime in developing countries encompasses three distinctive phases:6 
Phase One, developing countries revise laws and regulations due to external pressure 
from the United States to develop an IPR regime; Phase Two, under the threat of trade 
 
* SMU Dedman School of Law, candidate for J.D., 2009.  The author dedicates this article to his wife 
Karen and daughters Hannah and Bethany, for their unflagging love and support throughout the grueling 
law school experience.  He may be contacted at bradfordluo@gmail.com. 
** Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Madison, School of Law. 
1 In this note, China, the People’s Republic of China, and P.R.C. are used interchangeably. 
2 In 2008, China was the second largest economy in the world after the United States in terms of 
purchasing power parity. CIA, The World Factbook—China, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).  Since 2006, the Chinese economy has been 
the fourth largest in the world, after the United States, Japan, and Germany. Keith Bradsher, Chinese 
Economy Grows to 4th Largest in the World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/25/business/worldbusiness/25cnd-yuan.html. 
3 For example, the EU formed the EU-China IP Dialogue in 2003 to exchange views on IP policies and 
enforcement in China. European Commission, IPR in China (June 2, 2008), 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/intell_property/ipr_china_en.htm. 
4 See, e.g., Charles L. Miller, A Cultural and Historical Perspective to Trademark Law Enforcement in 
China, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 103, 103–04 (2004) (“As the Chinese are well aware, foreign firms are 
worried about the level of protection for all aspects of their intellectual properties whether it is patents, 
copyrights or trademarks.”); Jessica Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in Protecting 
Their Well-Known Trademarks in China, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937, 938 (2006) (“Many foreign firms have 
expressed apprehension about entering the Chinese marketplace because of an inability to register their 
trademark as well-known.”). 
5 See Wong, supra note 4, at 938; see also Ann M. Wall, Intellectual Property Protection in China: 
Enforcing Trademark Rights, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 341, 345 (2006). 
6 See Ruixue Ran, Well-Known Trademark Protection in China: Before and After the TRIPS 
Amendments to China’s Trademark Law, 19 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231, 245 (2002). 
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sanctions and market access losses from external pressure from the United States, 
developing countries launch enforcement campaigns against egregious infringement 
activities; and Phase Three, with economic development and progress, IPR protection 
becomes “self sustaining and a genuine ‘rule of law’ begins to emerge”7 as it becomes 
beneficial for developing countries to maintain strong IPR protection for all brands, local 
and foreign.8  China’s trademark law epitomizes the ever-evolving nature of China’s 
intellectual property laws. 
¶3 This note attempts to chronicle the evolution of China’s IPR protection regime in 
the narrow context of well-known marks.  Part I offers a brief overview of the history of 
China’s protection of well-known marks.  Part II examines the myriad forces, factors, and 
conditions that propelled the formation of China’s current institutional structure in 
protecting well-known marks.  Part III delves into the nuts and bolts of actual 
enforcement practice under the established well-known mark protection system.  Part IV 
evaluates the well-known mark enforcement practice as exemplified in a few influential 
Chinese cases.  Part V highlights the current debates both within and outside China about 
the existing Chinese well-known mark jurisprudence, foreshadowing what may come in 
China’s next round of amendments to the Trademark Law.  Finally, Part VI suggests 
areas of change for the Chinese well-known mark jurisprudence and offers reasons why 
such changes are necessary. 
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINA’S PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARKS 
A. The Current Institutional Structure of Well-Known Mark Protection 
¶4 China’s current institutional structure has been established by a series of laws and 
regulations.  This structure gives substantially more protection to well-known marks than 
to those not considered legally well-known.  Such protection extends to well-known 
marks of foreign and Chinese origin.  Owners of well-known marks are afforded a unique 
institutional structure to enforce their exclusive rights through administrative agencies or 
courts.  Like other jurisdictions, China has struggled with finding a definitive and 
efficient way to define “well-known” so as to provide some measure of certainty for 
those entrusted with the task of determining whether certain marks are legally well-
known. 
1. What Constitutes a Well-Known Mark Under Chinese Law? 
¶5 The 2001 Chinese Trademark Law (“CTL” or “2001 CTL”)9 does not expressly 
define well-known marks, but it does provide the following relevant factors to be 
considered in determining whether a mark is well-known: 
(1) reputation of the mark to the relevant public; 




9 Trademark Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective 
Oct. 27, 2001) http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a_no=2170&col_no=119&dir=200603 (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2001 CTL]. 
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(3) time period, extent and geographical area of advertisement of the mark; 
(4) records of protection of the mark as a well-known mark; and 
(5) any other factors relevant to the mark’s reputation.10 
In addition to the above, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) 
refers to a well-known mark as one “that is widely known to the relevant sectors of the 
public and enjoys a relatively high reputation in China” in its Provisions on the 
Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks (“Well-Known Mark Determination 
Provisions”),11 which was devised in accordance with the CTL.  Since the application of 
the Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions is limited to administrative agency 
actions, they are not binding on courts.  Being administrative in nature, they could serve 
as persuasive authority, as it is commonly known in common law jurisdictions.12 
¶6 The CTL gives weight to the “reputation of the mark to the relevant public” as a 
determining factor; however, a consumer-oriented test is ultimately subjective and 
“fundamentally vague,”13 in need of more concrete, detailed objective factors as a 
supplement.  Thus, the Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions provide that a well-
known mark applicant must meet the burden of proof by providing relevant materials, 
including: 
(1) documents evidencing the extent of the relevant public’s knowledge of the 
mark, 
(2) documents showing the history of continuous use and the history and scope 
of registration of the mark, 
(3) documents evincing the extent of adverting in terms of geographic scope, 
time, methods of advertisement and promotion, 
(4) protection records of the marks as being well-known both inside and outside 
of China, and 
(5) other documents tending to prove the mark as well-known, including the 
amount of sales, gross receipts, gross profit, and regions of sale in the most 
recent three years.14 
Regardless of their merits, these concrete requirements bring forth a certain degree of 
certainty to potential well-known marks applicants. 
2. Ways to Gain the “Well-Known Mark” Recognition 
¶7 China offers two alternative approaches to “fame”: (1) by administrative 
determination or (2) by judicial rendition.  For administrative determination, the owner of 
 
10 See id. art. 14. 
11 See Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks (promulgated by the St. 
Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Apr. 17, 2003, effective June 1, 2003) 
http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a_no=2160&col_no=119&dir=200603 (last visited Mar. 1, 
2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions]. 
12 See Edward E. Lehman et al., Well-Known Trademark Protection in the People’s Republic of China—
Evolution of the System, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 257, 271 (2003). 
13 Id. at 272. 
14 See Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions, supra note 11, art. 3. 
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a mark may present documents and evidence as set forth above in an administrative 
application15 or administrative opposition action pursuant to the Well-Known Mark 
Determination Provisions.16  The China Trademark Office has the administrative 
jurisdiction over such applications.  Additionally, the Well-Known Mark Determination 
Provisions allows a mark owner to apply for protection for its allegedly well-known mark 
in a local Administration for Industry and Commerce (“AIC”) office.17  These 
applications are eventually channeled to the China Trademark Office for determination in 
order to assess the proper means of protection for the marks in question.18  In the 
alternative, an aggrieved mark owner has the option to litigate in people’s courts for a 
judgment on whether the mark is well-known.19 
¶8 In addition to the above two methods, the CTL paves another “hybrid” way to 
determine whether a mark is well-known.  Namely, where an applicant disagrees with the 
decision rendered by the China Trademark Review and Adjudication Board (“TRAB”), 
which is the appellate body of the Chinese trademark administrative agencies, she can 
initiate an action20 against the TRAB in a court with competent jurisdiction pursuant to 
the Chinese Administrative Procedure Law.21  This additional option, required by the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs 
Agreement”) and agreed upon by China,22 offers extra protection and safeguards against 
arbitrary and inappropriate administrative decisions. 
3. Exclusive Rights Associated with Well-Known Marks 
¶9 Rights and privileges of a well-known mark are extensive in the Chinese 
institutional structure.  Article 13 of the CTL stipulates that where trademarks under 
application for registration for identical or similar commodities are reproduced, copied, 
or translated from famous trademarks not registered in the People’s Republic of China by 
others and may easily cause confusion, they shall not be registered and shall be 
prohibited from use: 
Where trademarks under application for registration for non-identical [sic] or 
non-similar [sic] commodities are reproduced, copied, or translated from famous 
 
15 See id. 
16 See id. art. 4., para. 1. 
17 Id. art. 5. 
18 Id. art. 6. 
19 See Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu shen li shang biao min shi jiu fen an jian shi yong fa lii ruo gan 
wen ti de jie shi [Judicial Explanations on Several Issues Regarding Applicable Laws in Adjudicating Civil 
Trademark Disputes] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 12, 2002, effective Oct. 16, 2002), art. 
22, http://www.cntrademark.com/CN/laws/trademark/laws008.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2008) (P.R.C.) 
[hereinafter 2002 Trademark Dispute Explanations]. 
20 See 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 43. 
21 Administrative Procedure Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 
1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 25, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/adminLitigationENG.php (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter China Administrative Procedure Law]. 
22 See World Trade Organization, The Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, art. 
2(D), WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc; see also Veron Mei-Ying 
Hung, China’s WTO Commitment on Independent Judicial Review: Impact on Legal and Political Reform, 
52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 78–79 (2004). 
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trademarks registered in the People’s Republic of China by others and may easily 
misguide the public, and interests of registrants of such famous trademarks may 
be damaged accordingly, they shall not be registered and be prohibited from 
being used.23 
Article 13 extends protection for well-known marks, registered or unregistered, in China.  
If a well-known (i.e. “famous”) mark is registered in China, the owner of the mark can 
exclude others from registering, reproducing, copying or translating the mark.  This rule 
applies to both similar and dissimilar goods of all types.24  On the other hand, if a mark is 
unregistered and has been deemed as well-known in China by a judicial decision, the 
owner can still avail itself of the accompanying protection by preventing the mark’s use 
or registration in similar or identical categories of goods.  Article 4 gives equal treatment 
and protection to owners of service marks and trademarks.25  Finally, Article 15 gives the 
owner of a registered mark the right to oppose the unauthorized registration and use of 
the mark by its agent or representative, thus enjoying an added protection for the owner 
where the agency relationship sours.26 
¶10 The Supreme People’s Court of China (“SPC”) tackled the issue of trademark 
infringement head-on in the context of domain name registration in its 2001 Several 
Explanations on Domain Name Civil Disputes.27  It expressly provided that a mark owner 
can appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction to determine whether its mark is famous, 
and the court may order the cancellation of the infringing domain name if it finds unfair 
competition.  Further, monetary damages are available to the victorious plaintiff and, 
upon request, the court may order the transfer of such infringing domain name to the 
plaintiff.28 
¶11 Despite the extensive rights associated with well-known marks, dilution protection 
remains an academic concept in China.  Rights-holders cannot bring a dilution claim in 
either court or administrative agencies in China.  Whether China will adopt anti-dilution 
provisions in its CTL is unknown at this point.  Part V.B.2 of this note discusses dilution 
law in China in detail. 
4. Well-Known and Non-Well-Known Marks Compared 
¶12 Extensive rights, as discussed above, accompany well-known marks in comparison 
with regular, non-well-known marks.  First, well-known marks, either registered or 
unregistered, are protected under the CTL because of China’s commitment to the Paris 
Convention.  In contrast, regular, non-well-known marks must be registered in China in 
 
23 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 13. 
24 An Qinghu, Well-Known Marks & China’s System of Well-Known Mark Protection, 95 TRADEMARK 
REP. 705, 713 (2005). 
25 Id. art. 4 (“The provisions made in this Law concerning goods trademarks shall apply to service 
marks.”). 
26 Id. art. 15. 
27 Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu shen li sheji jisuanji wangluo yuming minshi jiufen an jian shi yong 
fa lv ruo gan wen ti de jie shi [Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning 
Application of Laws When Trying Civil Dispute Cases Related to Network Domain Names] (promulgated 
by the Sup. People’s Ct., July 17, 2001, effective July 24, 2001) 2001 FA SHI 24, translated in ISINOLAW 
(last visited Mar. 1. 2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Domain Name Explanations]. 
28 Id. arts. 4–8. 
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order to be protected, since China is a first-to-file jurisdiction where only registered 
marks are protected by the CTL.29 
¶13 Second, if registered marks are well-known under the CTL, exclusive rights extend 
across all types of goods and services.  In other words, an infringer will be held 
accountable for illegally using a registered well-known mark irrespective of whether the 
use was for goods or services similar or dissimilar to the right-holder’s types of goods or 
services.  However, protection for registered, non-well-known marks only extends to use 
in goods or services that are either the same or similar to those of the rights-holder.30 
¶14 Third, a mark owner can sue an infringer for unfair competition to prohibit him 
from using the mark as a domain name, which might cause confusion,31 but the mark in 
question must be well-known.  This remedy, unfortunately, is not available for regular, 
non-well-known marks.  To be exact, there is no “anti-cybersquatting” protection for 
regular marks. 
¶15 In terms of well-known marks, protection for those that are registered and those 
that are unregistered also differs.  For example, infringers of a registered well-known 
mark, if found liable, must not only refrain from further infringement, but also pay 
damages.  The sole remedy for infringement of an unregistered well-known mark, on the 
other hand, is a cease and desist order if the infringement involves a “reproduction, an 
imitation, or a translation of a well-known trademark or the major part of a well-known 
mark of another . . . .”32  In sum, well-known marks are entitled to broader and more 
effective protection if they are identified as such by relevant authorities in China.33 
B. How Did the Current Institutional Structure Evolve? 
¶16 Rome was not built in a day.  Neither was the current Chinese institutional structure 
for protecting well-known marks.  More than two decades of combined legislative and 
administrative efforts led to its current form.  The protection of well-known marks does 
not exist in a vacuum; rather, it developed in the greater context of the Chinese trademark 
law.  This law’s enactment, enforcement, amendment, and development reflect China’s 
gradual transition from a centrally-planned economy to a socialist market economy.  
Therefore, a clear understanding of the evolution of the Chinese well-known mark 
jurisprudence depends, to a large extent, on a bird’s-eye view of the transformation of 
China’s trademark law in the past two decades. 
1. Protection of Well-Known Marks Before 1985 
¶17 Trademark concepts and practices have a long history in China.  Some date the first 
recorded Chinese trademark at approximately 2698 B.C.,34 while others trace the 
 
29 See 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 4. 
30 See Regulations for the Implementation of the Trademark Law (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 
3, 2002, effective Sept. 15, 2002), art. 50(l), translated in Trademark Office, State Admin. Indus. & 
Commerce, Laws & Regulations, http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/english/show.asp?id=53&bm=flfg (last visited Mar. 
1, 2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Implementation Regulations]. 
31 See Domain Name Explanations, supra note 27, art. 5. 
32 See An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 742. 
33 See id. at 765. 
34 See Ke Shao, Look at My Sign!—Trademarks in China from Antiquity to the Early Modern Times, 87 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 654, 654 (2005). 
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emergence of the concept of trademark in China to the Northern Zhou Dynasty, which 
ruled China around 556–580 A.D.35  China’s first trademark law was enacted in 1904 in 
the Qing Dynasty.36 
¶18 After 1949, the Chinese Communist Party annulled the existing intellectual 
property laws.37  The new China under communist rule promulgated the Provisional 
Trademark Registration Regulations38 in 1950 and the Trademark Administration 
Measures in 1963,39 but both of these standards were premised on the idea that individual 
invention and innovation belonged to the collective community, which emphasized 
product quality associated with trademarks rather than rights of trademark owners.40  
During the Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1976, whatever the Chinese trademark 
regulatory regime had to offer was obliterated.41  Modern China’s first trademark law did 
not emerge until two decades later in 1982 when China, under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping, drastically altered its political and economic policies.  To establish legal and 
economic infrastructures conducive to foreign investment, China began to accept 
commercial principles of Western economies.42  This fundamental change of national 
policy, often referred to as “Reform and Opening Up,”43 resulted in China’s membership 
in the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) in 1980 and the adoption of 
the 1982 Trademark Law (“1982 CTL”).  Despite these unprecedented friendly gestures 
to foreign investment, however, well-known trademark protection was not on the 
legislative agenda until a few years later. 
2. Protection of Well-Known Marks Between 1985 and 2001 
¶19 The sixteen years between 1985 and 2001 saw rapid transformations in China’s 
trademark law.  China became a signatory to the Paris Convention,44 subjecting itself to 
the obligations of this international treaty regarding well-known marks.45  Although the 
requirements of the Paris Convention Article 6bis were not incorporated into the CTL 
until the 2001 amendments, compliance with it began in earnest starting in 1987 on an ad 
hoc basis. 
¶20 In 1987, in the first ever well-known mark opposition action involving a foreign 
mark, an Australian company applied to register the “Pizza Hut” trademark at the China 
 
35 See Wong, supra note 4, at 940. 
36 See Ruixue Ran, supra note 6, at 232. 
37 See Weiqiu Long, Intellectual Property in China, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 63, 65 (1999). 
38 See Shang biao zhuce zai xing tiao li [Provisional Trademark Registration Regulations] (promulgated 
by the St. Council, Aug. 28, 1950) 1 FAGUI HUIBIAN 528 (1952), translated in PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 
358 (1960) (P.R.C.). 
39 Shang biao Guanli Tiaoli [Trademark Administration Regulations] (promulgated by the St. Council 
and adopted by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 10, 1963, effective Apr. 10, 1963) 
http://hi.baidu.com/21dakai/blog/item/962eab8b531550d3fd1f1085.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008) 
(P.R.C.). 
40 See Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China, 21 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 259, 269–70 (1986). 
41 See id. at 272. 
42 Wong, supra note 4, at 941. 
43 See Weiqiu Long, supra note 37, at 69. 
44 An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 708. 
45 Id. 
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Trademark Office for use in its “cake and powder products.”46  The Pizza Hut 
International Company lodged its opposition, requesting the “Pizza Hut” mark be 
registered under its own name,47 as it had been in many other countries.  The China 
Trademark Office determined that “Pizza Hut” and its “roof logo” were both legally well-
known under Chinese law based on their registration history.  The Office refused to 
register the same mark by the Australian company,48 and it conferred well-known status 
upon the “Pizza Hut” mark, albeit without a formal certificate, which would have served 
as the basis for “continued protection without the need to resort to ad hoc means.”49  Two 
years later, the China Trademark Office began to recognize well-known marks on a 
regular basis, granting them formal certificates. 
¶21 Extensive economic reforms of the early 1990s necessitated and paved the way for 
substantial changes to China’s IPR protection system.  First, the Trademark Law was 
amended in 1993 to meet “the need of economic development and safeguard fair 
competition in the market . . . .”50  Second, protection of well-known marks was written 
into the Implementation Regulations of the Trademark Law (“Implementation 
Regulations”);51 these regulations started China’s domestic law-making process for 
protecting well-known marks.  Third, the Chinese legislature adopted the Law Against 
Unfair Competition in 1993.52  This law prohibited passing off of registered marks and 
well-known marks,53 affording trademark owners additional administrative and judicial 
recourse in the event of infringement.  Additionally, the Law Against Unfair Competition 
filled the legal vacuum with respect to trade dress and trade secrets, offering much 
anticipated and needed protection to such intellectual property.54 
¶22 China’s regulations on well-known marks continued to evolve throughout the 
1990s; this evolution was evidenced by the Interim Provisions on the Determination and 
Administration of Well-Known Marks (“Interim Well-Known Mark Provisions”) issued 
by the SAIC.55  To fulfill China's commitment to the Paris Convention, and using the 
TRIPs Agreement (of which China was not a member) as a guide, China adopted the 
Interim Well-Known Mark Provisions, providing a comprehensive, systematic blueprint 
for administrative determination56 and protection of well-known marks.57  In spite of its 
 
46 Lehman et al., supra note 12, at 259. 
47 Id. 
48 An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 708. 
49 Lehman et al., supra note 12, at 259. 
50 See An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 709. 
51 Implementation Regulations, supra note 30. 
52 See Law Against Unfair Competition (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993) ISINOLAW (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (P.R.C.). 
53 See id. art. 5. 
54 See Weiqiu Long, supra note 37, at 83. 
55 See Chi ming shang biao ren ding he guan li zan xing gui ding [Interim Provisions on the 
Determination and Administration of Well-Known Marks] (promulgated by the State Admin. Indus. & 
Commerce, Aug. 14, 1996, effective Aug. 14, 1996) 
http://www.cntrademark.com/CN/laws/trademark/laws026.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2008) (P.R.C.) 
[hereinafter Interim Well-Known Mark Provisions]. 
56 See id. art. 5. 
57 See Guo Tingbin, Wo guo chi ming shang biao fa lii bao hu ti xi de wan shan [The Improvements of 
China’s Well-Known Mark Protection System], 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/2004_10/12/1445438787.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). 
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ostensible misuse by many domestic mark owners,58 the Interim Well-Known Mark 
Provisions indeed composed an administrative framework through which owners of 
registered well-known trademarks could exclude others from using their marks.59  
Between 1996 and February 2002, the SAIC, pursuant to the Interim Well-Known Mark 
Provisions, determined 274 marks to be well-known.60 
¶23 Besides administrative determination, judicial recognition of well-known marks 
also became a viable option in 2001.  In the landmark case regarding the “DUPONT” 
trademark of DuPont Co.,61 the Beijing Higher People’s Court—for the first time in 
Chinese judicial history—held that the trademark at bar was well-known for the purpose 
of assessing appropriate remedies in a trademark infringement case.  Judicial recognition 
of well-known marks, affirmed by the 2002 Trademark Dispute Explanations,62 has since 
been firmly established. 
¶24 The following table charts the chronology of important developments in China’s IP 
laws and regulations. 
TABLE 1. 
Date Laws & Regulations 
1950 China adopts the Provisional Trademark Registration Regulations. 
1963 China adopts the Trademark Administration Measures. 
1980 China becomes a member in the WIPO. 
1982 China adopts the Trademark Law. 
1984 China adopts the Patent Law. 
1985 China becomes a member of the Paris Convention. 
1986 China becomes signatory to the Madrid Agreement. 
1990 China adopts the Copyright Law. 
1992 
 
Sino-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of IPR. 
Patent Law is amended. 
China becomes a signatory to the Berne Convention. 
1993 
 
Trademark Law is amended. 
China adopts the Law Against Unfair Competition. 
1995 Sino-U.S. Agreement on IPR. 
 
58 Id. 
59 See Interim Well-Known Mark Provisions, supra note 55, arts. 8–9. 
60 An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 712. 
61 Id. 
62 2002 Trademark Dispute Explanations, supra note 19. 
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 Rules for Trademark Review and Adjudication 
China becomes a member of the Madrid Protocol. 
1996 China issues the Interim Provisions on the Determination and Administration of Well-
Known Marks.  
1997 China amends the Criminal Law, including crimes against IPR. 
1999 China-U.S. Bilateral Agreement on WTO. 
2000 Patent Law is amended. 
2001 
 
Trademark Law is amended. 
Copyright Law is amended. 
China joins the WTO. 
2002 Implementing Regulations on Trademark Law 
2003 Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks 
2006 China’s Action Plan on IPR Protection 
2007 China’s Action Plan on IPR Protection 
2008 Amendments to Patent Law are adopted. 
II. THEORY UNDERLYING CHINA’S CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ON WELL-
KNOWN MARK PROTECTION 
¶25 From the late 1970s to 2008, the CTL and other laws on IPR have experienced 
dramatic changes as China became a global economic powerhouse.  The transformation 
in Chinese IPR laws, especially trademark laws and regulations, can be attributed to a 
confluence of domestic and international forces.63  These internal and external forces 
propelled Chinese legal scholars, administrators, policy-makers, and legislators to 
establish an institutional regime for protecting trademark rights in order to accomplish a 
multiplicity of purposes.  The following section will take a closer look at these forces that 
led to the current institutional structure and will analyze for what purposes this structure 
was established. 
A. Internal Forces (Economic, Political, and Legislative) 
¶26 Notwithstanding the popular notion that China constructed its intellectual property 
protection infrastructures (including a multi-tiered system of administrative enforcement 
and judicial review) primarily to meet international standards, Professor Peter Yu has 
warned against such a simplistic and Western-centric view.64  He observed that China’s 
 
63 See Ruixue Ran, supra note 6, at 231. 
64 See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO 
China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 913–14 (2006). 
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legislative and rule-making frenzy prior to its accession to the WTO was designed, in 
part, to make the Chinese intellectual property protection system conform to WTO 
standards.65  At the same time, amendments to Chinese intellectual property laws, 
including the CTL, were largely a result of domestic conditions.  As the late Chinese 
leader Deng Xiaoping once said about instituting comprehensive reforms in China—
“crossing the river by touching the stones”—the Chinese authorities are pragmatic in 
programming their economic policies.  They approach reforming the Chinese legal 
system with great caution, and the evolution of the CTL reflects this general governing 
philosophy. 
¶27 Revising the trademark law is one of the means to accomplish the overall national 
goal of re-establishing a legal system that was demolished during the Cultural 
Revolution.66  Irrespective of their nature and merits, trademark regulations established 
during the 1950s and early 1960s at least provided a basis for registering and managing 
trademarks.  The Cultural Revolution, a ten-year political and economic disaster, ravaged 
China’s existing legal system.  This is because the preeminent purpose of the revolution 
was class struggle, which made individual ownership of property out of the question.  
Waking up from the decade-long national nightmare, the Chinese leadership recognized 
the importance of a legal regime that could protect private property, thus initiating the 
march towards the rule of law.67  Since then, thousands of laws and regulations have been 
adopted.68 
¶28 This growing sense of the importance of private property ownership lays yet 
another societal foundation for intellectual property laws to germinate and flourish.  In 
1982, the Chinese Constitution was amended to recognize the private ownership of 
intellectual property, ending the monopoly of intellectual property ownership by the 
state.69  The country, however, continued to adhere to the fundamental and long-standing 
principle of ownership by the people70 at the behest of the Chinese Communist Party.  
Unfortunately, under the 1982 CTL and the 1993 CTL, natural persons could not file an 
application to register a trademark, which substantially limited the availability of the 
newly-created constitutional property rights.  That limitation, in the context of China’s 
further affirmation of private property rights, dissolved into history because the 2001 
CTL makes natural persons eligible to register trademarks in addition to legal persons.71 
¶29 Effecting economic reforms and attracting foreign investments was also an impetus 
for amending China’s trademark laws.  Immediately following China’s subscription to 
the “Reform and Opening up” policy, Chinese trademark professionals “produced 
legislative solutions to new and expanded trademark issues that emerged as China 
accelerated industrialization and encouraged foreign investment,” which led to the 
adoption of the 1982 CTL.72  In 1992, China’s resolve on economic reforms strengthened 
 
65 Id. 
66 See Michael N. Schlesinger, A Sleeping Giant Awakens: The Development of Intellectual Property 
Law in China, 9 J. CHINESE L. 93, 100 (1995). 
67 See Weiqiu Long, supra note 37, at 67. 
68 See STATE COUNCIL, WHITE PAPER: CHINA’S EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN PROMOTING THE RULE 
OF LAW (2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-02/28/content_7687418_4.htm. 
69 See Weiqiu Long, supra note 37, at 71. 
70 Id. 
71 See 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 4. 
72 Sidel, supra note 40, at 273. 
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following “Deng Xiaoping’s famous ‘tour’ of Southern China.”73  Subsequently, the 
National People’s Congress amended the Chinese Constitution in 1993 to state that: 
The state practices socialist market economy.  The state strengthens economic 
legislation, improves macro-regulation and control.  The state prohibits in 
accordance with the law any organization or individual from disturbing the socio-
economic order.74 
Guided by the spirit of the newly-amended Constitution, Chinese law and rule makers 
orchestrated what is referred to as the “Millennium Amendments” right before China’s 
entry into the WTO, which encompassed a revamping of China’s IPR protection 
system.75  As a result of the Millennium Amendments, patent, copyright, and trademark 
laws were ostensibly amended with the aim of conforming to the TRIPs Agreement.  
Furthermore, various implementing regulations and administrative measures were 
promulgated pursuant to these amended laws.  In particular, the 2001 CTL was adopted 
by the National People’s Congress.  Subsequently, its Implementation Regulations were 
issued.  This all took place in an overall economic and political shift in China.  The 
Director General of the China Trademark Office under the SAIC noted that, in creating a 
new trademark system, China’s government was responding to: 
. . . [a] deepening of reform and opening policy. . .[,] the development of the 
market economy[, and] . . . the requirements of a domestic integrated market, 
economic globalization and China’s WTO accession . . . .76 
Therefore, it is inaccurate and ill-informed to characterize China’s revision of its 
intellectual property laws on the eve of its WTO entry simplistically, as a passive reaction 
to foreign pressures. 
B. External Forces (the U.S., International Treaties, and International Standards) 
¶30 As alluded to above, external forces also played a significant role in the 
amelioration of China’s intellectual property laws.  Of all the foreign players affecting 
China’s intellectual property protection system, the Americans are probably the most 
vocal and aggressive.  Because exporting high-tech goods and knowledge-intensive 
products and services has become a “very important sector of the American economy,”77 
the U.S. government has linked international trade policies with the adequate protection 
of American IPR, threatening nations with trade sanctions if its demands are not met.78  
The Chinese government has experienced U.S. protests, demands, and threats of 
sanctions over the Chinese intellectual property protection system since 1979.  From the 
first Sino-American bilateral agreement in 1979, the Agreement on Trade Relations 
 
73 Yu, supra note 64, at 917. 
74 XIAN FA, art. 15 (1993) (P.R.C.). 
75 See Yu, supra note 64, at 906. 
76 See An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 713. 
77 See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-
First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 132 (2000). 
78 Id. 
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Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China,79 to multiple 
bilateral intellectual property agreements signed respectively in 1992,80 1995,81 and 
1996,82 and the “long march” style WTO negotiations, China has been willing to 
compromise and to take noticeable measures to advance its intellectual property 
protection system.83 
¶31 Besides sovereign nations, international treaties and non-binding international 
standards were also instrumental in helping to shape China’s current intellectual property 
laws.  For example, China’s membership in the Paris Convention in 1985 immediately 
resulted in instances of foreign well-known marks being protected.  Even though the Joint 
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks 
(adopted by WIPO and the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1999) 
exercised no binding force on WIPO members, its provisions represented yet another 
international attempt to standardize the universal protection of well-known marks.  Its 
“guiding function [could not] be ignored because it represents the trend of international 
protection of well-known marks.”84  With respect to the powerful impact of international 
treaties, the late Professor Zheng Chengsi, an expert in Chinese intellectual property 
laws, put it succinctly: 
In order to carry out its open reform policy, China has no other choice but to 
establish and strengthen its intellectual property protection system.  This is 
especially true after the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) finally linked intellectual property with 
international trade and the information highway.85 
C. Chinese Trademark Law and the Evolving Legislative Intent 
¶32 As all trademark laws do, the CTL and its various implementing regulations serve 
particular legislative purposes.  For instance, the Lanham Act was enacted in the United 
States to basically serve the dual purpose of protecting the rights of both consumers and 
mark owners.86  China’s 1982 CTL, replacing the 1963 Trademark Administrations 
Regulations, expressly stated in Article One that it was adopted: 
. . . for the purpose of improving the administration of trademarks, protecting the 
right to exclusive use of trademarks and encouraging producers to guarantee the 
quality of their goods and maintain the reputation of their trademarks, so as to 
 
79 Id. at 136. 
80 See Ruixue Ran, supra note 6, at 233 (the Sino-US Memorandum of Understanding). 
81 See id. (the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Rights Accord). 
82 See id. (the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Rights Accord). 
83 See generally Yu, supra note 77, at 142–50 (describing various Chinese responses to threats of U.S. 
sanctions in the mid-1990s). 
84 See An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 712. 
85 Zheng Chengsi, The TRIPS Agreement and Intellectual Property Protection in China, 9 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 219 (1998). 
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
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protect the interests of consumers and promote the development of the socialist 
commodity economy.87 
Enshrouded in the midst of administrative purposes was the legislative intent to protect 
“trademark rights,” which launched China’s recognition and protection of private 
trademark rights.  When the SAIC issued its Interim Well-Known Marks Provisions in 
1996, it intended to use these provisions as a temporary vehicle to “protect the legitimate 
rights and interests of the owner of a registered trademark, safeguard the social economic 
order[,] and promote economic development.”88  As the “Millennium Amendments” 
ushered in a “new and improved” CTL, they enabled the Chinese trademark law to 
substantially comply with the TRIPs Agreement.  Not surprisingly, the CTL and its 
Implementation Regulations clung to the basic three-pronged legislative intentions: (1) 
the management of trademarks, including requirements on quality associated with marks; 
(2) consumer protection; and (3) protection of private property rights of trademark 
owners.89  According to one commentator, the CTL, viewed in the context of the history 
of trademark law in China, represented a major step forward in terms of its guiding 
principles and basic values on trademarks; however, it did not elevate the protection of 
private property rights as a principal legislative intent, and it still bears the obviously 
significant function of strengthening administrative management authorities.90  A 
derivative of the CTL, the Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions, suffers from the 
same legislative infirmity, where the protection of private IPR is overshadowed by the 
overall administrative regulatory tone of the trademark law. 
III. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF ENFORCING WELL-KNOWN MARK RIGHTS IN CHINA 
A. Opposing the Registration of Well-Known Marks in China 
¶33 Unlike many common law jurisdictions, China subscribes to the first-to-file system 
to establish trademarks rights.91  Under this system, prior use of a certain mark, without 
registering it in the China Trademark Office, does not generate trademark rights, whereas 
prior use of a mark can establish trademark rights in the United States.  Therefore, 
owners of marks who are unfamiliar with China’s trademark registration system face 
grave challenges of their rights being infringed in China.  This is especially true for 
owners of well-known marks, given that well-known marks are substantially more 
valuable and susceptible to infringement.92  To avail themselves of the protection for 
 
87 See Trademark Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, 
effective Mar. 1, 1983), art. 1, ISINOLAW (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (P.R.C.). 
88 See An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 711. 
89 See 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 1; Implementation Regulations, supra note 30, art. 1. 
90 See Feng Xiaoqing, Shang biao fa de san ci xiu gai ruo gan wen ti tan tao [Discussions on the Several 
Issues China Third Round of Amendments to the Trademark Law] CHINALAWINFO, available at 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=art&Gid=335583000 (last visited Feb. 7, 
2009) (P.R.C.). 
91 See 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 4; Jeffrey F. Levine, Meeting the Challenge of International Brand 
Expansion in Professional Sports: Intellectual Property Right Enforcement in China Through Treaties, 
Chinese Law and Cultural Mechanisms, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 203, 221 (2007); see also Weiqiu 
Long, supra note 37, at 75. 
92 See An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 771. 
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well-known marks, owners or their agents must be familiar with the detailed procedures, 
as well as the substantive provisions, provided under China’s well-known mark safeguard 
regime. 
1. Procedures for Opposing the Registration of a Well-Known Mark 
¶34 The fundamental basis for opposing the registration of a well-known mark in China 
lies in Articles 13 and 14 of the CTL.93  Procedurally, the owner of a well-known mark 
can object to the registration by filing an opposition petition with the Trademark Office 
within the three-month statutory open-opposition period.94  In its opposition, the mark 
owner must state the cause, state the basis thereof, and submit relevant supportive 
documents.95  In a case involving an unregistered foreign well-known mark, the owner 
can exclude others from registering the mark for use in connection with goods and 
services that are the same or similar to those under use by the owner.96  In order to do so, 
however, the applicant may submit evidentiary documents pursuant to Article 14 of the 
CTL in order to establish that the mark in dispute is well-known under Chinese Law.97  
Likewise, if the mark is registered in China, the applicant bears the same burden of proof 
to exclude others from registering the mark at all for any categories of goods or 
services.98  Within thirty days after the filing of the documents under Article 14 of the 
CTL, the Trademark Office usually notifies the mark registrant to respond within thirty 
days.99  If the Trademark Office requests additional documents, the applicant must supply 
requested materials within three months of the request, and the failure to do so timely 
results in a deemed relinquishment of the right to submit further proof.100 
¶35 An opposition applicant can appeal an unfavorable decision rendered by the 
Trademark Office.  The first recourse is to appeal to the TRAB101 for review within 
fifteen days of the last decision from the Trademark Office.102  The CTL provides that a 
well-known mark owner can appeal, within thirty days, the unfavorable decision of the 
TRAB to a people’s court.103  Cases of this nature fall into the realm of an administrative 
action, where the TRAB is a named party, and Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction as the trial court.104 
 
93 See 2001 CTL, supra note 9, arts. 13–14. 
94 Id. art. 30. 
95 Implementation Regulations, supra note 30, art. 22. 
96 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 33; Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions, supra note 11, art. 4. 
97 Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions, supra note 11, art. 4. 
98 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 33; Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions, supra note 11, art. 4. 
99 Implementation Regulations, supra note 30, art. 22, para. 2. 
100 Id. para. 3. 
101 See Shang biao ping shen gui ze xiu ding [Trademark Review & Adjudication Rules] (promulgated 
by the St. Admin. Indus. & Commerce, Sept. 26, 2005, effective Oct. 26, 2005), art. 2(i), 
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-10/10/content_75527.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
TRA Rules]. 
102 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 33, para. 1. 
103 Id. para. 2. 
104 See An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 716, 763. 
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¶36 These recourses for opposing the registration of a well-known mark are actually 
sequential: the “former procedure is the prerequisite for the latter one.”105  Also, 
complying with the time limits in each step is of paramount importance.106 
2. Procedures and Requirements for Cancelling a Registered Mark 
¶37 A registered mark in violation of Article 13 of the CTL can be legally cancelled by 
its legitimate owner.107  Cancellation procedures differ from those of opposition 
procedures in two pronounced aspects.  First, the owner can file a cancellation petition 
directly with the TRAB, bypassing any encounters with the Trademark Office,108 which 
potentially saves time and reduces costs and expenses due to infringements.  Second, the 
statute of limitations for a cancellation case is five years from the date of the registration 
in question.109  However, if the registration in question is malicious and in bad faith, the 
petition is not bound by the five-year statute of limitations.110  As with opposition, the 
owner requesting cancellation can appeal the TRAB’s decision to the Beijing First 
Intermediate People’s Court within thirty days of TRAB’s decision. 
3. Procedures and Requirements for Cancelling an Infringing Entity Name 
¶38 Registering an entity name that is identical or similar to a registered well-known 
mark violates the exclusive rights of the well-known mark’s owner.111  Rights-holders of 
well-known marks may petition a competent authority in the AICs to cancel illegal 
registration of entity names using their marks, where such entity names are “likely to 
deceive or mislead the public.”112  The competent authority must respond in accordance 
with the Provisions for the Registration and Administration of Enterprise Names (“Entity 
Names Provisions”);113 there is no requirement that the marks in question be certified as 
well-known in China.114  In other words, the well-known status of marks is not a 
condition precedent to the cancellation of offending entity names; instead, the relevant 
authority should examine whether the entity names complained of are “likely to deceive 
or mislead the public”115 as set forth in the Entity Names Provisions.116 
 
105 Id. at 715. 
106 Id. at 715–16. 




111 See Implementation Regulations, supra note 30, art. 53; see also Well-Known Mark Determination 
Provisions, supra note 11, art. 13. 
112 See An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 727. 
113 Administrative Rules on Enterprise Name Registration (promulgated by the St. Council, July 22, 
1991, effective Sept. 1, 1991) ISINOLAW (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Entity Names 
Provisions]. 
114 See An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 728. 
115 See id. 
116 See Entity Names Provisions, supra note 113, art. 9(2). 
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B. Opposing the Use of Well-Known Marks in China 
¶39 With respect to opposing trademark infringement in commerce, China follows a 
unique bifurcated approach.  Readily available for the owner of an infringed mark are 
four distinctive legal options.  For a cost-effective way to fight infringement, the owner 
or licensee may request the AIC to investigate and prohibit unauthorized use of the mark.  
Filing a trademark infringement civil lawsuit is another viable option.  An owner may 
also engage the Chinese police, the Public Security Bureau, for criminal enforcement.117  
In addition, a rights-holder might also consider utilizing the Chinese customs authorities 
to combat counterfeiting and other infringing conducts.  While other effective extra-
judicial, non-administrative means118 also exist, these four methods are most widely 
known and relied upon in China.  Among the four methods, administrative enforcement 
and civil law suits in the people’s courts are the most commonly deployed methods,119 
both of which have their advantages and disadvantages in the Chinese intellectual 
property protection regime. 
¶40 The CTL’s proscription of illegal use of a registered mark encompasses a wide 
range of activities, including: 
(1) to use a trademark that is identical with or similar to a registered trademark in 
respect of the identical or similar goods without the authorization from the 
trademark registrant; 
(2) to sell goods that he knows bear a counterfeited registered trademark; 
(3) to counterfeit, or to make, without authorization, representations of a 
registered trademark of another person, or to sell such representations of a 
registered trademark as were counterfeited, or made without authorization; 
(4) to replace, without the consent of the trademark registrant, its or his 
registered trademark and market again the goods bearing the replaced 
trademark; or 
(5) to cause, in other respects, prejudice to the exclusive right of another person 
to use a registered trademark.120 
Aside from the above five types of prohibited use, the SPC augmented the exclusive 
rights of rights-holders in its 2002 Trademark Dispute Judicial Explanations.  
Specifically, three more types of use are also actionable: (1) registering an entity name 
with a registered trademark for use in goods or services that are similar or identical to the 
trademark owner; (2) copying, imitating, or translating a registered well-known mark or 
using distinctive portions of such a mark in goods or services different from those of the 
legitimate owner, thereby causing consumer confusion and injuries to the owner; and (3) 
registering a domain name with words identical or similar to a registered trademark and 
using such domain name in electronic commerce, thereby causing confusion in the 
 
117 See Yu, supra note 64, at 947. 
118 See Peter K. Yu, Still Dissatisfied After All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO China, and 
the Avoidable Cycle of Futility, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 155–56 (2005) (stating that “the legal 
system is not the only option available to protect intellectual assets”). 
119 See Yu, supra note 64, at 946. 
120 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 52. 
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relevant public.121  As rights associated with a registered mark are exclusive, a violation 
of any one of the above—or of any combination of them—constitutes infringement, 
against which the rights-holder can file administrative, civil, or criminal complaints. 
1. Enforcement Procedures Through the AIC 
¶41 A request to halt trademark infringement in commerce must be supported by 
relevant evidence.  Where a well-known mark is allegedly being infringed, the 
complainant shall provide evidence under Article 14 of the CTL to establish that its mark 
is well-known, thus entitling it to administrative protection.122  The AIC has the authority 
to prohibit use of the mark, seize and destroy the “trademark representations,”123 and 
destroy products when the goods and infringing labels cannot be separated.124 
¶42 Administrative enforcement through the AIC can be a double-edged sword.  On the 
one hand, local AICs, under the auspices of the SAIC, have become an important tool of 
both the government and private right-holders to counter infringement activities.125  On 
the other hand, even though the transaction cost to bring an administrative enforcement 
action is relatively low at the outset, the complainant has limited remedies.  AICs cannot 
award economic damages or issue injunctions.  These are available only through Chinese 
courts.  Furthermore, rampant local protectionism and prevalent corruption among AICs 
can reduce the efficacy of administrative enforcement because local AIC officers and 
local government leaders often act in concert with infringers.126  Rights-holders might 
also find that local AICs lack the necessary means to quickly affect desired changes, not 
to mention their inability to enforce their own orders for lack of funds and qualified 
human resources.127 
2. Enforcement Through the People’s Courts 
¶43 Courts will continue to play an ever-increasing128 role in trademark protection in 
China for a number of reasons.  As indicated above, China must adhere (and has adhered) 
to its WTO commitment to establish independent judicial review of administrative 
enforcement cases.129  This inevitably will divert some administrative enforcement cases 
to the judicial system.  But that is only part of the story.  As China institutes more 
 
121 2002 Trademark Dispute Explanations, supra note 19, art. 1. 
122 See Implementation Regulations, supra note 30, art. 45. 
123 An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 716.  The phrase “trademark representations” generally includes signs, 
emblems, packaging, and any other materials that infringe upon a well-known mark. 
124 Implementation Regulations, supra note 30, arts. 44–45. 
125 See Wong, supra note 4, at 965. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See Wang Doudou, Shu zi jie du qi nian zhi shi chan quan shen pan [Interpreting Intellectual 
Property Rights Trials Through Seven Years of Data], LEGAL DAILY, Feb. 20, 2008, available at 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/misc/2008-02/20/content_800347.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).  
Intellectual property cases saw exponential growth in China from 2001 to 2007. Id.  During those seven 
years, trial courts accepted 77,463 cases and disposed of 74,200 cases, experiencing an annual growth of 
22.6% and 22.92% respectively in case acceptance and disposition. Id.  Out of the total number of 
intellectual property cases above, 11,598 trademark cases were accepted and 10,743 disposed of. Id. 
129 See Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China’s WTO Commitment on Independent Judicial Review: Impact on 
Legal and Political Reform, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 78–79 (2004). 
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specialty intellectual property tribunals in economically advanced jurisdictions130 and as 
more Chinese judges become versed in adjudicating disputes on IPR,131 right-holders 
have increasingly opted for the courts to safeguard their rights.132 
¶44 Civil actions can be brought in people’s courts of competent jurisdiction,133 while 
criminal complaints must be referred to the PSB for prosecution.134  Before proceeding 
further into the details of both bringing civil and criminal complaints in China, the 
complexity of the Chinese judicial system warrants a brief primer. 
¶45 The Chinese court system consists of general people’s courts and special courts.135  
General people’s courts are structured into a four-tiered136 system in terms of judicial 
review power, reflected in the following ascending order: district/trial courts, 
intermediate courts, higher people’s courts, and the SPC.  Trial courts are tribunals 
established in counties and small cities without administrative districts; these courts 
adjudicate the full gambit of cases ranging from civil disputes, to criminal trials, to 
administrative actions.137  The next tier comprises intermediate people’s courts, which 
typically are located in prefectures and mid- to large-sized cities with administrative 
districts.  Higher people’s courts are courts of the highest authority in China’s provinces, 
autonomous regions, and four municipalities.  The highest court of the land is the SPC, 
which has appellate jurisdiction to review cases from lower courts, as well as original 
jurisdiction in certain situations;138 it also exercises appellate review139 over special 
courts.140  Within each of the four-tiered courts are tribunals to try matters of varying 
natures—civil, economic, criminal, and administrative.141  Special courts include 
maritime, military, railway transportation, and forestry courts, all of which are designated 
and restricted to hear disputes in those highly specialized and narrow areas.142 
¶46 Notably, unlike common law jurisdictions like the United States and the United 
Kingdom, where the doctrine of stare decisis applies in their judicial system,143 the 
Chinese civil law system honors higher courts’ decisions only to the extent that 
circumstances in the case at bar are similar to those in earlier cases.144  Nonetheless, 
judicial interpretations, explanations, and guidance opinions issued by the SPC are meant 
 
130 See Wong, supra note 4, at 968. 
131 See Yu, supra note 64, at 946–47. 
132 Id. at 947. 
133 See Wall, supra note 5, at 387. 
134 Id. at 389–90. 
135 See The National Court Organizations (May 20, 2003), 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/state_structure/65040.htm. 
136 See Kate Colpitts Hunter, Here There Be Pirates: How China Is Meeting Its IP Enforcement 
Obligations Under TRIPS, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 523, 527 (2007). 
137 See Jiang Zhipei, People’s Courts and Special People’s Courts in the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/courts/court3.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
138 See Jiang Zhipei, The Organization, Functions and Powers of the People’s Courts, 
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/courts/court1.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See Levine, supra note 91, at 219. 
142 See The National Court Organizations, supra note 135. 
143 Stare decisis is a doctrine where higher courts’ decisions are binding upon lower courts. See In re 
Osborne, 76 F.3d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1996). 
144 See Alexander C. Chen, Climbing the Great Wall: A Guide to Intellectual Property Enforcement in 
the People’s Republic of China, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 38 (1997). 
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to effect uniformity among courts on the interpretation and application of laws.  Although 
these judicial explanations are not, in theory, “laws,”145 they do serve as “gap fillers”146 
for lower courts.  Insofar as appeals are concerned, plaintiffs are entitled to one appellate 
review;147 thus, the judgment and order from the court of second instance are final and 
binding.148 
¶47 In recent years, China has created specialized tribunals devoted to handling 
intellectual property cases.149  As of the end of 2003, all 31 higher people’s courts in 
China had created IP tribunals to review intellectual property related cases,150 and most 
intermediate level courts had also established special panels for the same purpose.151  The 
latest trend in China is to concentrate IP cases into courts or court panels where judges 
are highly trained in order to achieve uniformity in the application of law, streamline the 
relevant procedures, and maximize the usage of judicial resources.152  For that purpose, 
Justice Cao Jianmin of the SPC has called for the establishment of independent IP courts 
in the intermediate court level, although such courts would remain administratively 
attached to intermediate courts.153 
¶48 To sue in intermediate people’s courts—the courts of first instance in trademark 
infringement actions154—rights-holders of well-known marks must exercise care in 
meeting the procedural and evidentiary requirements, in addition to stating valid causes 
of action.  With respect to procedures, the statute of limitations for trademark 
infringement is two years from the date when the plaintiff knew or should have known of 
the infringement.155  Jurisdiction and venue for infringement usually lie in the 
intermediate people’s courts where the infringing activities took place or where the 
 
145 Mo Zhang & Paul J. Zwier, Burden of Proof: Developments in Modern Chinese Evidence Rules, 10 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 419, 422 (2003). 
146 Id. at 422 n.15 (citing AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 21 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu 
eds., 1997)). 
147 See Chen, supra note 144, at 39. 
148 See AFD China, Outline of the Chinese Trademark System, 
http://www.anxinfonda.com/article_trademark_2.htm#30 (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
149 See Yu, supra note 64, at 947; see also Jiang Zhipei, Wo guo shou li zhi shi chan guan an shang 
sheng She wai an jian shen li nan du jia da [Chinese Courts Accept More IP Cases; Difficulties Increase in 
International IP Cases] (Dec. 18, 2003), http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/spxx/spxx320.htm (last visited Feb. 
21, 2008). 
150 Jiang Zhipei, supra note 137. 
151 See Wang Doudou, Zui gao fa yuan tiao zheng zhi chi chan guan an jian shen pan guan xia ti zhi 
[Supreme People’s Court to Adjust the Organization of Jurisdiction Relative to IP Cases], LEGAL DAILY, 
Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/2007fjdt/2008-02/21/content_800817.htm. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. (during the Second National IP Trial Working Meeting of P.R.C, Justice Cao Jianmin summarized 
the current developments and trends in IP cases, and expressed that the establishment of more independent 
IP courts in the intermediate level would be one of a means to effect the adjustment of jurisdictional 
reorganization in IP cases). 
154 See Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu shen li shang biao an jian you guan guan xia he fa lv shi yong 
fan wei wei ti de jie shi [Judicial Explanations on Jurisdiction and the Applicability of Law in Trademark 
Trials] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 25, 2001, effective Jan. 21, 2002), art. 1, 
http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/pub/show.asp?id=21&bm=flfg (last visited Feb. 22, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter SPC 
2001 Trademark Judicial Explanations]. 
155 See J. Benjamin Bai et al., From Infringement to Innovation: Counterfeiting and Enforcement in the 
BRICs, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 525, ¶ 44 (2007); see also Mark S. Sommers & Virginia L. Carron, 
Managing Counterfeiting in China, IP LITIGATOR, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 38. 
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infringer resides.156  Extensive discovery, as practiced in the United States, does not exist 
in China.157  Evidentiary standards familiar to common law jurisdiction legal 
professionals are much more complicated in China, in that the Chinese legal system 
currently has no “unified evidence code, per se.”158  To sustain or defend a claim, each 
party must muster its own evidence and bear its burden of proof in accordance with the 
Several Rules of Evidence Concerning Civil Litigation.159  These rules160 reduce the 
courts’ role in gathering evidence by putting the onus on the parties. 
3. Enforcement Through Criminal Prosecution 
¶49 Owners of well-known marks might also go after infringers through criminal 
prosecution.  Criminal prosecution of IPR has its basis in the Chinese Criminal Law and a 
series of judicial explanations put forth by the SPC.  The maximum prison sentence for 
trademark counterfeiting is three years for “relatively large” counterfeiting sales;161 a 
sentence of three to seven years is rare, reserved for extreme circumstances162 where 
“huge sales”163 of counterfeit goods occur.  “Relatively large” and “huge sales” were not 
clearly defined in the Criminal Law, but the SPC came out with its judicial explanations 
in 2004.164  The SPC set detailed parameters and thresholds regarding the level of 
culpability required for sentences.165  In practice, rights-holders first have to file 
complaints with the PSB to conduct investigations on alleged infringement; the PSB will, 
in turn, refer “egregious” cases to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate for prosecution.166 
4. Enforcement Through the Customs Office 
¶50 The General Administration of Customs (“GAC”) also has administrative 
jurisdiction over trademark protection, albeit limited in scope.167  A condition precedent 
to customs enforcement is the recordation of trademarks with the GAC.168  To properly 
 
156 See Hunter, supra note 136, at 527. 
157 See United States Embassy-Beijing, IPR Toolkit, http://beijing.usembassy-
china.org.cn/iprpatent.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
158 See Zhang & Zwier, supra note 145, at 420. 
159 Id. 
160 See Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu min shi su song zheng ju de ruo gan gui ding [Several Evidence 
Rules Concerning Civil Litigation] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. Adjudication Comm., Dec. 21, 
2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002) 2001 FA SHI 33, available at 
http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/ssf/200311/20031109201210.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (P.R.C.). 
161 See Xing fa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 
1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), arts. 213–220, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/criminalLawENG.php 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (P.R.C.). 
162 Id. 
163 See Omario Kanji, Note, Paper Dragon: Inadequate Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in 
China, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1261, 1274 (2006). 
164 Zui gao ren min fa yuan Zui gao ren min jian cha yuan guan yu ban li qin fan zhi shi chan xing shi an 
jian ju ti ying yong fa lv ruo gan wen ti de jie shi [Explanations on Several Issues Regarding the Specific 
Application of Laws in Criminal Intellectual Property Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 
11, 2004, effective Dec. 22, 2004) http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/pub/show.asp?id=97&bm=flfg (last visited Feb. 
22, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
165 See Kanji, supra note 163, at 1273–75. 
166 See United States Embassy-Beijing, supra note 157. 
167 See Wall, supra note 5, at 384. 
168 See id. at 375. 
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record marks with the GAC, an applicant must submit relevant documents along with an 
application for recordation, which must include: 
(1) the name, registration place or nationality, etc. of the right owner; 
(2) the title, content and relevant information of the intellectual property right; 
(3) any licensing agreement signed for the intellectual property right; 
(4) the name, producing place, the Customs located in importing or exporting 
place, importer, exporter, principle features, price and other information of 
the goods in which the right owner exercise their intellectual property right 
legitimately; 
(5) the manufacturer, importer, exporter, the Customs located in importing or 
exporting place, principle features, price and other information of the goods 
which have been known to infringe the intellectual property right; 
Any certificates should be submitted, if there is any.169 
Assuming that proper recordation is in place at the GAC, rights-holders must still apply 
for the detention of suspected shipments of infringing goods and present supporting 
evidence or documents to the GAC.170  Further, rights-holders must post a bond not 
exceeding the value of the suspected goods for customs detention.171  With respect to 
detention, rights-holders must pay for the related cost of “warehousing, maintenance, and 
disposal of the goods incurred”172 by the GAC; otherwise, the GAC may deduct such 
costs from the bond.  Simultaneous to the GAC enforcement, rights-holders may also 
apply to the people’s court for a court order to enjoin infringement,173 but they must pay 
damages if either the court or the GAC finds that the suspected shipment of goods does 
not violate any existing rights.174 
IV. WELL-KNOWN MARK PROTECTION IN REPRESENTATIVE CASE LAW 
¶51 As noted above, the people’s courts are playing an increasing role in IPR 
enforcement.  As required by the TRIPs Agreement, member countries must make 
transparent their laws, regulations, final administrative and judicial decisions.175  Such 
information is available in Chinese electronically.  Most significantly, a large number of 
judicial decisions rendered by trial courts and appellate courts can be found at a single 
source—China IPR Judgments & Decisions.176  As such, data compiled and released by 
the Chinese authorities and case law corroborate the assertion that the people’s courts 
 
169 See Regulations on Customs Protection of IPRs (promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 26, 2003, 
effective Mar. 1, 2004), art. 7, translated in Industry Updates, CHINA DAILY Apr. 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-04/20/content_572304.htm (P.R.C.). 
170 See id. art. 13. 
171 See id. art. 14. 
172 See Wall, supra note 5, at 384. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 385. 
175 See Hunter, supra note 136, at 541. 
176 China IPR Judgments & Decisions, http://ipr.chinacourt.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). 
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have been busy enforcing IP laws.  The following chart177 demonstrates the judicial 
enforcement scene in China: 
TABLE 2. 




Annual growth rate Disposed of by 
people’s courts 
Annual growth rate 
Trademark 11,598 No data 10743 No data 
Patent 18,521 No data 17,764 No data 
Copyright 28,776 No data 28,170 No data 
Unfair Competition 7,934 No data 7,832 No data 
Technology 
Contracts 
6,277 No data 5,516 No data 
Foreign party 
involved 
No data No data 1,634 57.95% 
Total 77,463 22.60% 74,200 22.92% 
Foreign observers178 of Chinese IP enforcement also noted the rise of court actions.179  
This rise of court actions has inevitably generated many interesting decisions, which 
provide a window into China’s judicial interpretation of its various IP laws and 
regulations.  This section examines two recent cases, decided by the people’s courts and 
the TRAB. 
A. Ferrari v. Jiajian 
¶52 The Beijing First Intermediate Court had the occasion to decide, in an 
administrative action pursuant to the 2001 CTL, whether the design of the prancing 
horse, combined with the word “Ferrari,” of the Italian Ferrari Company was a well-
known trademark.  Ruling against Ferrari, the court held that the prancing horse design 
was not well-known in China for the purpose of the case at bar.180 
¶53 Ferrari’s “horsing” saga started back in 1996 with a Chinese trademark registrant.  
Ferrari began doing business in China in 1993, and considered China to be one of its key 
international markets.181  It registered its “Ferrari & Prancing Horse Design” combination 
trademark in China.  A Chinese department store in Guangzhou, Jiajian Sports 
 
177 Wang Doudou, supra note 128. 
178 See Tony Chen & Pilar Woo, China in 2004 and Beyond, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (Supp. Jan. 
2005), Jan. 2005, available at http://www.managingip.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=495719 (“China has 
seen a rising number of IP cases.”). 
179 See Wall, supra note 5, at 388. 
180 Yang Wang, Fa la li shang biao bei pan “bu chi ming” [Ferrari’s Prancing Horse Lost Its Footing 
and Was Held to Be Not Well-Known], BEIJING TIMES, July 10, 2007, at A10, available at 
http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2007-07/10/content_126196.htm. 
181 See Ferrari in China, http://www.seriouswheels.com/cars/top-2005-Ferrari-612-Scaglietti-Tour-
China.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
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Merchandise Company, Ltd. (“Jiajian”), sought to register a design-only mark with the 
symbol of a prancing horse for use in selling clothing on April 1, 1995.  Jiajian registered 
its mark in connection with Nice Class 25182—the designation for clothing.  When the 
China Trademark Office published the prospective “Prancing Horse Mark” for public 
opposition on September 7, 1996, Ferrari filed a timely opposition.  Ferrari claimed that 
Jiagian’s trademark, with its designated types of goods, was confusingly similar to its 
“Ferrari & Prancing Horse Design” combination mark already registered in China, 
because the mark was to be used in similar types of goods.  The China Trademark Office 
rejected its argument, stating that Jiajian’s registration of its mark predated any alleged 
mark belonging to Ferrari. 
¶54 Ferrari then appealed to the TRAB, arguing that both the “Ferrari & Prancing 
Horse Design” combination mark and its unregistered prancing horse design mark 
constituted well-known trademarks; therefore, the registration sought by the opponent, if 
granted, would cause confusion among consumers.  Unfortunately for Ferrari, the TRAB 
disagreed and affirmed the original decision.183 
¶55 Ferrari then took its battle to the Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court for 
judicial review of the prior administrative decision.  In the court, Ferrari averred that 
since the “Ferrari” word mark was already a well-known mark recognized by the China 
Trademark Office, and since the “Ferrari & Prancing Horse Design” combination mark 
was already registered in China, the prancing horse design mark should automatically be 
a well-known mark. To support that argument, and to convince the court that it should be 
able to bootstrap the “well-known” status to the prancing horse design, Ferrari posited 
that the Ferrari trademark had become well-known around the world and had gained 
considerable familiarity among Chinese consumers.184  However, the court flatly rejected 
Ferrari’s claim of fame for its unregistered design mark.185  The court gave three reasons: 
(1) The key issue here was whether the unregistered “prancing horse” design mark and 
the registered “Ferrari & Prancing Horse” combination were famous before Jiajian’s 
registration of its mark.  Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the use and advertisement 
relative to its design mark.  Plaintiff proffered evidence supporting the famous status of a 
related trademark—“Ferrari” the word mark, but that is not sufficient to prove that that 
the design mark in question is entitled to well-known mark protection as requested.  (2) 
China has established an independent system to recognize well-known trademarks.  The 
recognition of the “Ferrari” word mark as well-known in China does not equate to the 
like recognition of the “Prancing Horse” design mark, because the recognition of the 
former does not constitute adequate legal basis for the recognition of the latter.  (3) The 
focal issue in the suit was not the “Ferrari” mark; rather it is the “Prancing Horse” design.  
Therefore, evidence of the well-known status of “Ferrari” word mark cannot be evidence 
 
182 China became a member of the Nice Agreement in August 1994, and the China Trademark Office 
uses standard Nice Classification in registering trademarks. See World Intellectual Property Organization, 
International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks Under the 
Nice Agreement, available at http://www.wipo.int/classifications/nivilo/nice/index.htm. 
183 See Yang Wang, supra note 180. 
184 See Guo Jing-Xia, Fa law li gong si “ben ma” shang biao bu guo cheng chi ming shang biao 
[Ferrari’s "Prancing Horse” Held Not to Be a Well-Known Mark], July 7, 2007, 
http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=53336. 
185 See Yang Wang, supra note 180. 
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that the “Prancing Horse” design mark and the “Ferrari & Prancing Horse” combination 
mark are well-known in relevant marks in China. 
¶56 This case offers a textbook example of how a prolonged well-known trademark 
enforcement action unfolds in China’s well-known mark protection regime.  At a first 
glance, it might be shocking to learn that the prancing horse design mark was deemed not 
to be well-known, given its relative fame in the West.  However, in order to rationally 
gauge whether the Ferrari court got it right, it is necessary to analyze whether the 
decision comports with the relevant provisions of the Paris Convention, the TRIPs 
Agreement, the CTL and other provisions under Chinese law regarding well-known 
marks. 
1. Ferrari and the Paris Convention 
¶57 As indicated above, China became a member of the Paris Convention in 1985, so it 
is bound by the treaty to protect well-known marks of other Union countries, though they 
may be unregistered in China.  Article 6bis of the Paris Convention provides: 
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so 
permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the 
registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a 
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark 
considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be 
well known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the 
benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods.  These 
provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a 
reproduction of any such well-known mark or an imitation liable to create 
confusion therewith. 
(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be allowed 
for requesting the cancellation of such a mark.  The countries of the Union may 
provide for a period within which the prohibition of use must be requested. 
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the prohibition 
of the use of marks registered or used in bad faith.186 
Under the Paris Convention, a member country has the obligation to “refuse or to cancel 
the registration” of a trademark that is a mere reproduction, imitation or translation of a 
well-known trademark from another member’s jurisdiction.  However, the obligation is 
activated only if the allegedly infringing trademark is to be used for identical or similar 
goods and such use is likely to cause confusion.  These two conditions create a significant 
impediment for the holder of a well-known mark to enforce its rights in a foreign 
jurisdiction since it has to prove the likelihood of confusion, and its protection is limited 
to goods that are similar or identical to its own.  The use of a mark for goods that are 
different from the well-known mark owner’s goods falls beyond the scope of protection 
under the Paris Convention.  Furthermore, since the Paris Convention does not define 
 
186 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html. 
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“well-known,” it leaves relevant authorities of a given jurisdiction wide latitude in 
deciding what constitutes a well-known mark for the purpose of stopping infringement in 
that jurisdiction.187 
¶58 In view of China’s obligation under the Paris Convention, the Ferrari court’s 
decision is correct under international law.  First, and most damaging for Ferrari, was that 
the defendant’s purported use of the prancing horse design mark was for selling general 
and fur clothing, which is vastly different from automobiles and sports vehicles.  Had 
Ferrari been in the business of selling clothing, the defendant’s intended use of the 
prancing horse mark might have been legally objectionable under the Paris Convention.  
Second, under the Paris Convention Article 6bis, Ferrari also must show the likelihood of 
confusion in order to prevail.  To establish confusion, the pertinent question is whether 
the general consuming public would be confused as to the source of the defendant’s 
clothing sold with the “Prancing Horse” design logo.  Unfortunately, the court did not 
analyze this issue.  Even if the court had analyzed the issue, Ferrari’s burden of proof 
would have been high because it must have shown that the relevant Chinese consumers 
would associate the defendant’s clothes with Ferrari. 
2. Ferrari and the TRIPs Agreement 
¶59 China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) makes compliance 
with the TRIPs Agreement and other international conventions incorporated therein 
mandatory.188  On protecting well-known marks, Article 16 of the TRIPs Agreement 
provides: 
(1) The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent 
all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade 
identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to 
those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result 
in a likelihood of confusion.  In case of the use of an identical sign for identical 
goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.  The rights 
described above shall not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect 
the possibility of Members making rights available on the basis of use. 
(2) Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
services.  In determining whether a trademark is well-known, Members shall take 
account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, 
including knowledge in the Member concerned which has been obtained as a 
result of the promotion of the trademark. 
(3) Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a trademark 
is registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to those goods or 
services would indicate a connection between those goods or services and the 
 
187 See Bella I. Safro & Thomas S. Keaty, What’s in a Name? Protection of Well-Known Trademarks 
Under International and National Law, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 33, 38 (2004). 
188 See Lehman et al., supra note 12, at 267. 
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owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the owner of 
the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.189 
The TRIPs Agreement extends protection for unregistered well-known marks to service 
marks.  It also prohibits the use of registered well-known marks in goods or services that 
are dissimilar “in respect of which a trademark is registered.”190  Further, where an 
identical sign is used for identical goods or services, such use is presumed to generate 
confusion, thereby lowering the plaintiff’s burden of proof.191  Despite the expanded 
protection for well-known marks provided by the TRIPs Agreement, Ferrari still would 
not prevail.  The prancing horse design mark is not registered in China, and Ferrari’s 
failure to register this mark effectively removes its entitlement to the expanded protection 
under Article 16.  Additionally, because the defendant’s use of the prancing horse mark 
was for goods different from Ferrari’s goods and services, there is no presumption of 
confusion.  Given this analysis, the Ferrari court did not abridge Ferrari’s rights under 
the TRIPs Agreement. 
3. Ferrari and Chinese Law 
¶60 As the CTL192 and the Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions193 both provide 
factors for determining whether a mark is well-known, Ferrari may look to the relevant 
Chinese laws and regulations to ascertain whether the court erred.  The TRIPs Agreement 
requires member countries, in determining well-known marks, to consider “the 
knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in 
the Member concerned which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the 
trademark.”194  As discussed in Part I.A.1 of this note, both the CTL and the Well-Known 
Mark Determination Provisions require the relevant authorities to take into account the 
public’s knowledge about the mark and its reputation.  These requirements are not only 
consistent with the TRIPs Agreement, but are also indicative of the international standard 
on determining well-known marks set forth by the WIPO in the Joint Resolution 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks (“WIPO Joint 
Resolution”).  In relevant part, the WIPO Joint Resolution provides: 
(1) [Factors for Consideration] 
(a) In determining whether a mark is a well-known mark, the competent 
authority shall take into account any circumstances from which it may be 
inferred that the mark is well known. 
(b) In particular, the competent authority shall consider information 
submitted to it with respect to factors from which it may be inferred that 
 
189 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 16, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
190 See id. art. 16(3). 
191 See id. art. 16(1). 
192 See 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 14. 
193 See Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions, supra note 11, arts. 2–3. 
194 See TRIPS, supra note 189, art. 16(2). 
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the mark is, or is not, well known, including, but not limited to, 
information concerning the following: 
1. the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the 
relevant sector of the public; 
2. the duration, extent and geographical area of any use of the 
mark; 
3. the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion of 
the mark, including advertising or publicity and the presentation, 
at fairs or exhibitions, of the goods and/or services to which the 
mark applies; 
4. the duration and geographical area of any registrations, and/or 
any applications for registration, of the mark, to the extent that 
they reflect use or recognition of the mark; 
5. the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark, in 
particular, the extent to which the mark was recognized as well 
known by competent authorities; 
6. the value associated with the mark.195 
The Ferrari court deemed the prancing horse design mark to be not well-known, 
primarily because the plaintiff failed to proffer evidence of advertising and publicity in 
China.  Discussion and analysis of another important factor, knowledge of and reputation 
of the mark in the relevant public sector, is not available because the opinion is not 
published.196  The CTL does not define “relevant public,” but the Well-Known Mark 
Determination Provisions defines it as consumers of the goods or services associated 
with the mark, and the relevant market players in the production and distribution of goods 
or services.197  Given this apparent absence of definition regarding “relevant public” in 
the CTL, it gives too much discretion to the courts to interpret it notwithstanding the 
Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions.  To reduce such discretion and possible 
abuse, the author suggests that China adopt in incorporate into the CTL the position 
advanced in the WIPO Joint Resolution, which states: 
(a) Relevant sectors of the public shall include, but shall not necessarily be 
limited to: 
(i) actual and/or potential consumers of the type of goods and/or services 
to which the mark applies; 
 
195 See WIPO, Joint Resolution Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, WIPO 
Doc. A/34/13, art. 2 (1) (1999) [hereinafter WIPO Joint Resolution], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=1101 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
196 Chinese courts selectively publish opinions, and this case was not released for publication. 
197 See Well-Known Mark Determination Provisions, supra note 11, art. 2. 
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(ii) persons involved in channels of distribution of the type of goods 
and/or services to which the mark applies; 
(iii) business circles dealing with the type of goods and/or services to 
which the mark applies. 
(b) Where a mark is determined to be well known in at least one relevant sector 
of the public in a Member State, the mark shall be considered by the Member 
State to be a well-known mark. 
(c) Where a mark is determined to be known in at least one relevant sector of the 
public in a Member State, the mark may be considered by the Member State to be 
a well-known mark. 
(d) A Member State may determine that a mark is a well-known mark, even if the 
mark is not well known or, if the Member States applies subparagraph (c),known, 
in any relevant sector of the public of the Member State.198 
A unified position on the “relevant public” is desirable because of the sheer geographic 
size of China and the hugely divergent economic variances across China.199  Generally 
speaking, coastal areas of China and major municipalities have relatively advanced 
economies with sophisticated consumers.  In other less developed regions, such as the 
vast western and southwestern regions of China, economic development lags far behind 
and consumers have less exposure to foreign brands.  In light of the economic disparity 
among different regions in China, consumers’ knowledge and familiarity vary widely.  
Therefore, to hold foreign mark owners to a standard of “the relevant public” without 
regard to the consumer market reality in China would be unfair. 
B. Starbucks Corp. v. Shanghai Xingbake Coffee Corp.200 
¶61 In 1996, Starbucks Corporation registered the word mark “Starbucks” and various 
designs associated with its brand in China.  The company also registered thirty types of 
products under the “Starbucks” mark in 1997, and later added more services and products 
to the word mark in China.  On February 1, 1999, Starbucks first registered the Chinese 
version of the “Starbucks” mark—“Xingbake” [星巴克]—in Taiwan; however, it did not 
begin the registration process of “Xingbake” in China until 1998.  While waiting for 
Chinese approval for the registration of “Xingbake,” Starbucks launched massive 
advertising campaigns with its registered mark “Starbucks” and the then-pending 
“Xingbake” mark.  In addition, the first Starbucks chain store began operation in Beijing 
in January 1999.  Starbucks finally registered the “Xingbake” trademark in China on 
December 28, 1999. 
 
198 See WIPO Joint Resolution, supra note 195, art. 2(2). 
199 See Richard S. Gruner, Intellectual Property in the Four Chinas, INT’L L. NEWS, Spring 2008, at 2 
(arguing that there are “four Chinas” in terms of intellectual property enforcement, given the differences of 
commercial development, research and development focus, and attitudes of local authorities). 
200 Starbucks Corp. v. Shanghai Xingbake Coffee Corp. (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct., Dec. 20, 2006), 
available at http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=5919. 
 147
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 9  
 
¶62 While Starbucks’s application for the trademark “Xingbake” was pending, the 
defendant Shanghai Xingbake Coffee, Ltd. successfully registered the entity name 
“Xingbake.”  On March 9, 2000, the defendant finalized its incorporation, with its 
principal business being the sale of beverages, western-style meals, and alcoholic drinks.  
The defendant printed “Starbuck Coffee” on its price list and used the characters 
“Xingbake Coffee” in their store front and advertising billboards. 
¶63 After a failed effort at private settlement and an unsuccessful administrative action 
with the Shanghai AIC,201 Starbucks sued the defendant in the Shanghai Second 
Intermediate People’s Court for trademark infringement and unfair competition.  The trial 
court found for the plaintiff on both issues.  The defendant’s appeal followed in the 
Shanghai Higher People’s Court, whose decision was final and binding on the 
outstanding issues.  These issues included: (1) whether the appellant’s successful 
registration of the entity name “Xingbake” defeated Starbucks’s claim of trademark 
infringement, given that the entity registration predated that of the plaintiff’s “Xingbake”; 
and (2) whether the defendant’s usage of the corporate name “Xingbake” and “Starbuck 
Coffee” constituted unfair competition.  On both issues, the court affirmed, handing 
Starbucks a sound victory. 
¶64 In its opinion, the court stated its analysis and rationale for affirming the lower 
court.  With respect to trademark infringement, the court pointed to evidence of bad faith 
in the defendant’s preemptive registration of the corporate name “Xingbake.”  In 
addition, it found the “Starbucks” and the “Xingbake” marks to be well-known in the 
context of the plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim, citing that both marks had been 
widely known in China prior to the defendant’s preemptive registration.  The plaintiff 
was well-known in China for its “wide use, publicity and reputation”202 associated with 
its marks.  Further, the court opined that Starbucks’s usage and attainment of rights 
relevant to the “Xingbake” mark predated any rights the defendant had obtained through 
its preemptive registration of its entity name.  Moreover, the court held that the 
defendant’s malicious preemptive registration of it entity name “Xingbake” violated the 
CTL and basic commercial ethics—equality, honesty and good faith. 
¶65 This case serves as a microscope into judicial enforcement of trademark rights in 
Shanghai,203 one of the most modern and international cities in China.204  Compared to 
courts in rural areas, urban courts are better staffed, with highly educated and trained 
judges205 whose judgments reflect a better understanding of the law and a higher degree 
of professionalism.  The significance of this high profile case is multifaceted. 
¶66 First, it demonstrated that the court was willing to recognize an unregistered 
foreign mark as well-known, in compliance with the Paris Convention.206  Foreign 
corporations often raise the concern that they do not receive the same level of protection 
 
201 See Wong, supra note 4, at 954. 
202 See id. at 956. 
203 See id. at 959 (“The Starbucks decision was an important case for the Chinese trademark protection 
system.  This case demonstrates the progress China has made in protecting well-known marks, but also 
draws attention to the challenges that foreign corporations still face in protecting their trademarks.”). 
204 See Wikipedia, Shanghai, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
205 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM & HE XIN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA: PATTERNS, CAUSES, AND 
PROGNOSIS 6 (2008), available at 
http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Peerenboom_He%20Xin%231%23.pdf. 
206 See Wong, supra note 4, at 956–57. 
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as their Chinese counterparts in Chinese courts.207  They argue that China recognizes 
local, well-known marks more often than foreign marks.  However, by joining the Paris 
Convention, China embraced the obligation to recognize and protect a foreign well-
known mark unregistered in China, which the CTL incorporates in Article 13(a).  In 
addition, by virtue of China’s accession to the WTO, it obligated itself to give equal 
access and protection to foreign investors in certain aspects.  Notwithstanding the 
widespread notion that China has a spotty IPR protection record, and despite foreign 
governments’ formal and informal protests against China’s current IPR protection efforts, 
the court handed Starbucks the judicial protection that was required under international 
treaties.  In particular, even though Starbucks’s “Xingbake” mark was not a well-known 
mark in its own jurisdiction,208 the court nonetheless identified it as well-known.  
Furthermore, even though the mark was not registered in China at the time of the 
defendant’s registration, the court held it well-known on the ground that Starbucks’s 
rights in “Xingbake” predated those of the defendant because of prior use by, reputation 
of, and advertising conducted by Starbucks. 
¶67 Second, the court solidified its judicial authority by enforcing its own judgment.  
Many have commented that the Chinese IPR laws are strong on paper yet weak in 
enforcement.209  This institutional weakness escaped neither the court nor the Chinese 
legislature.  Months after the final disposition of the case, the defendant still had not 
changed its corporate name as ordered by the court.  To carry out its orders, the court 
actually froze the defendant’s assets and garnished its bank accounts.210  Eventually, 
under intense pressure, the defendant changed its business name to “Fangyun Coffee.” 
¶68 More significantly, to address the pervasive and rampant issue of non-compliance 
and non-enforcement of civil judgments,211 the Standing Committee of the NPC 
adopted212 revisions213 to the Civil Procedure Law of China.214  Pursuant to the revisions, 
 
207 See id. at 958. 
208 In order to invoke the Paris Convention protection, the mark in question must be well-known first in 
a member country of origin.  However, in this instance, “Xingbake” was not well-known in the United 
States. 
209 See Hunter, supra note 136, at 540; Lehman et al., supra note 12, at 273; Wong, supra note 4, at 964. 
210 See GD Chain, Xiaoming Li & Yang Li, Shanghai “Xingbake” geng ming wei tang yun ka fei Gai 
ming hou ten qui bu zu [Shanghai “Xingbake” Changed Its Entity Name; Business Lagging Behind], May 
18, 2007, http://www.gdchain.com.cn/News/newsdetail.asp?NewsID=54129. 
211 See Feifei Zhang & Xiangxiao Liu, Wou quo li fa cheng jiu you mu gong du Zhi xing bu li wen ti 
xiang dang pu bian [Our Country Has Achieved Significant Success in Legislation, but the Deficiency in 
Enforcement is Quite Common], LEGAL DAILY, July 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/0705/2007-05/24/content_623397.htm (reporting that China has achieved 
significant legislative successes, but enforcement of the laws lags far behind). 
212 See Quan quo ren min dai biao da hui Chang wu wei yuan hui guan yu xiu gai Zhonghua Remin 
Gongheguo min shi su song fa de jui ding [National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s Decision to 
Amend People’s Republic of China Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008) http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zt/2007-
10/28/content_1382611.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (P.R.C.) (stating that the Standing Comm. of the 
NPC adopted revisions to the Chinese Civil Procedure Law on Oct. 28, 2007). 
213 See Min shi su song fa [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008) http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-
10/28/content_788498.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
214 See Law of Civil Procedure (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 
9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), translated in China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission, Laws, http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/laws/laws_11.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) 
(P.R.C.). 
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people’s courts have the authority to fine individuals who fail to comply with court 
orders, to detain such individuals if non compliance continues, and to issue judicial 
disciplinary dispositions against such individuals.215  These concrete and specific legal 
changes represent the Chinese legal community’s concerted efforts to improve judicial 
enforcement in China, since courts are equipped with sharper teeth216 if trademark 
infringers do not comply with court orders.  Recent research shows that enforcement of 
judicial judgments in urban areas have made significant progress, despite contrary 
portrayal.217  In contrast, incentives for local protectionism still exist for non-enforcement 
in rural areas, so enforcements in those areas remain problematic.218  Under the revised 
Civil Procedure Law, effective April 2008, it remains to be seen how courts across China 
will utilize their newfound enforcement power. 
C. Reconciling Ferrari with Starbucks 
¶69 On the surface, the results in Ferrari v. Jiajian and Starbucks v. Shanghai Xingbake 
Coffee seem inconsistent; in substance, they share a great deal in common.  In both cases, 
(1) the trademarks in question were unregistered foreign marks at the time when alleged 
infringements occurred, and (2) the plaintiffs availed themselves of the CTL.  Ferrari 
attempted to oppose the registration of an infringing mark through administrative actions, 
and Starbucks sued both to enjoin the use of its unregistered mark and to recover civil 
damages via the judicial enforcement route.  Both rights-holders desired the 
comprehensive protections afforded to well-known marks, yet only Starbucks prevailed.  
The companies were similarly situated, yet they received almost opposite reactions from 
the Chinese courts.  This curious discrepancy, naturally, raises the question of “why?” 
¶70 A few material factors have surfaced consistently in Chinese courts’ determination 
of well-known marks, forming a tangible contour of judicial interpretation of the CTL on 
well-known marks.  Courts seem to give great weight to the extent and scope of 
advertising for the mark in question.219  Both the Ferrari court and the Starbucks court 
expressly used the amount of advertising for the marks in question as a very important 
element in their decisions.  Lack of advertising for Ferrari’s “Prancing Horse” design 
mark to a great extent led to its loss; whereas Starbucks’s extensive campaign for 
“Xingbake” inside and outside China tipped the scale in its favor.  Reputation is yet 
another piece of the well-known determination puzzle, and the Starbucks court and the 
court in Inter IKEA System B.V. v. Beijing CINET Co.220 took it into consideration.221  
Further, courts also consider evidence of registration in other jurisdictions.  In addition, 
evidence of use of marks (for example in Starbucks) can also come into play.  To 
 
215 See id. arts. 103–04. 
216 See Chen Hongwei & Lian Yingting, Ming shi su song fa xiu gai zheng shi que li guo jia zhi xing wei 
she ji zhi [Revised Civil Procedure Law Establishes National Judicial Enforcement Deterrence 
Mechanism] (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zt/2007-11/05/content_374345.htm. 
217 See PEERENBOOM & HE XIN, supra note 205, at 6. 
218 Id. 
219 See Wong, supra note 4, at 957 (stating that in Inter IKEA System B.V. v. Beijing CINET Co., the 
Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court “found IKEA to be a well-known mark because their goods 
and services had been advertised for an extended period of time around the world”); see also Lehman et al., 
supra note 12, at 272. 
220 See id. 
221 See Wong, supra note 4, at 957. 
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conclude, Chinese courts—especially courts in urban areas—consider multiple factors in 
their determination of well-known marks, all of which fall within the scope of Article 14 
of the CTL.222 
V. PROSPECT FOR CHANGE IN THE CURRENT WELL-KNOWN MARK PROTECTION REGIME 
¶71 With a historical perspective on the protection of well-known marks in the greater 
context of the past development of the CTL, this section sketches the contours of what 
well-known mark protection in China could be in the future.  As China continues its own 
search for the “rule of law”223 and as it strives to build a “socialist market economy,”224 
amending the current CTL and the entire trademark protection system is unavoidable.  In 
fact, earnest efforts to bring about a third round of amendments225 to the CTL are already 
under way.226  Legal communities in China and beyond are abuzz with excitement about 
this round of amendments to the CTL; consequently, some discussions about what the 
new law should look like have surfaced.  Because most notable discourse on the 
amendments are taking place among Chinese IP scholars and IP administrators, such 
constructive discourse largely foreshadows the content of the forthcoming amendments. 
A. Private Right vs. Public Policy 
¶72 There is an inherent conflict in the protection of trademark rights.  On the one hand, 
rights arising from either use or registration in trademarks are property rights.  As such, 
holders of such rights are entitled to protection.  That is to say, trademark laws serve as 
legal instruments in protecting private property.  On the other hand, trademarks operate to 
assist consumers in relating goods and services to their sources.  As such, a fundamental 
goal of most trademark laws is to effectuate the public policy of preventing consumer 
confusion.  The duel role of trademark law presents this inherent conflict of interests 
between rights-holders and the consuming public at large.  This conflict of interests, 
 
222 See 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 14. 
223 Establishing a society ruled by law has been a major political aspiration of the Chinese Communist 
Party (“CCP”) for decades, and the CCP has determined in its official report in the 17th Annual Communist 
Party Meeting that “the rule of law is a basic requirement for socialist democracy.” See Tang Zhixiang, Yi 
fa zhi guo shi she hui zhu yi min zhu zheng zhi de jib en yao qiu [Governing by Law is Socialism 
Democractic Politics’ Basic Requirement], HUNAN DAILY, Jan. 17, 2008, available at 
http://hnrb.hnol.net/article/20081/200811793330648186691.html; see also Chris Buckley, Elite China 
Think-Tank Issues Political Reform Blueprint, REUTERS, Feb. 18, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSPEK20590720080219 (stating that scholars at the CCP-
backed elite think-tank argues for the establishment of a modern civil system and mature democracy, and 
rule of law in the next three decades). 
224 See Yu, supra note 64, at 914–15. 
225 See Yang Peng, Shang biao fa di san ci xiu ding: da gai hai shi xiao xiu [Third Round of 
Amendments to Trademark Law: Major Overhaul or Minor Changes], FA ZHI WANG, Dec. 18, 2006, 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/misc/2006-12/18/content_489690.htm; Yang Yexuan, Que bao gong ping Ti 
gao xiao lii: Shang biao zhuan jia zhi chu shang biao fa xiu gai ji xu jie jue de san da yao dian [Ensure 
Fairness Improve Efficiency: Three Urgent Issues to Be Resolved in Current Chinese Trademark Law], 
http://www.trademark.gov.cn/Article_show.asp?Article ID=2566 (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (stating that 
efforts to amend the Trademark Law have stirred up public discussions and raised many concerns). 
226 The American Bar Association’s China Committee formed a China Trademark Law Task Group in 
2007, whose mission is to propose desired changes to the current Chinese Trademark Law.  The junior 
author of this note was a member of this Task Group. 
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present in the United States Lanham Act, is not news to trademark law scholars and 
policymakers in China.  It has raised debates as to how the new amendments to the CTL 
should address the conflicting goals of trademark law. 
¶73 The CTL currently plays a largely administrative role.227  Its main purpose is to 
administrate trademarks, protect consumers and other market players, and it has a 
secondary purpose is to protect the rights of rights-holders.  Given the legislative intent, 
the administrative functions of the CTL have ballooned into a lengthy and convoluted 
trademark opposition process.228  In particular, to oppose the registration of a well-known 
mark, a trademark owner may eventually have to undergo three separate administrative 
steps: (1) an original petition with the Trademark Office, (2) a subsequent appeal to the 
Trademark Office, and (3) an appeal to the TRAB.229  Then, the same owner could 
encounter two more judicial procedures in order to obtain a final judgment: petition and 
review at the Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court and the Beijing Higher People’s 
Court, respectively.  Combined, the entire opposition process consists of three 
administrative steps and two judicial procedures,230 the length of which sometimes 
stretches to more than a decade.231 
¶74 Consequently, this unnecessarily long administrative process, birthed by the current 
CTL, is unfavorable to right-holders.  It not only increases the cost of enforcing 
trademark rights, but also lengthens the period of time when rights-holders must endure 
uncertainties to their trademarks.232  Without a speedy resolution to alleged infringement, 
short of an injunction which is only available in courts, legitimate rights-holders will 
sustain extensive damages from alleged infringement and unfair competition.233  
Therefore, in the interest of providing meaningful protection to rights-holders by 
allowing a speedy and efficient administrative resolution, any amendments to the CTL 
should begin rebalancing the conflict of protecting the public and the owners of 
trademarks. 
B. Dilution Protection 
¶75 The legal concept of dilution in trademark rights protection remains in its infancy 
in China.  As debates swirl around whether and when China should adopt anti-dilution 
laws, trademark scholars, administrators, and practitioners in China look elsewhere, 
especially the United States, for answers responsive and relevant to China’s situation.  
With this in mind, the following section discusses the predominant features of anti-
dilution law in the United States and debates on anti-dilution law in China. 
 
227 See 2001 CTL, supra note 9, art. 1. 
228 See Yang Yexuan, supra note 225. 
229 See 2001 CTL, supra note 9, arts. 30–34. 
230 Id. 
231 Id.  For example, it took the Ferrari Company eleven years to receive a final defeat in the Beijing 
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1. Anti-Dilution Protection in the United States 
¶76 Prohibition against dilution in the United States is embodied in state and federal 
law.  Different from “traditional trademark infringement law,” dilution law does not have 
its roots in common law.234  The earliest scholarship on dilution in the United States is 
generally attributed to Professor Frank Schechter, who concluded that “the preservation 
of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its 
protection.”235  Following state legislation236 prohibiting trademark dilution, Congress 
adopted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”)237 in 1995 and amended it in 
2006 with the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”).238 
¶77 For dilution protection, “only strong marks need apply.”239  The FTDA240 and state 
dilution laws241 specify that dilution protection is available only to “famous” marks.  In 
order to be “famous” under the TDRA, trademarks must be widely recognized by the 
general consuming public of the United States,”242 serving as the sole identifying source 
for goods or services.243  This is a very high standard to meet, for good reasons. 
¶78 First, anti-dilution laws make available broad protection that is non-existent under 
traditional trademark infringement laws.  15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(B) defines “dilution by 
blurring” as “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a 
famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”244  And the statute 
further provides relief for dilution by tarnishment, stating “‘dilution by tarnishment’ is 
association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark 
that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”245  Under state and federal law, courts 
may find dilution in either blurring or tarnishment of marks.246  What is more, to sustain a 
dilution cause of action under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff had to prove actual dilution 
under the 1995 FTDA; this heightened standard of proof was further clarified by the 
Supreme Court in Mosley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc.247  However, the 2006 TDRA 
overturned the ruling in Mosley, requiring a plaintiff to only prove the “likelihood of 
 
234 See SHUBHA GHOSH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND 
THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY 536 (2007). 
235 See id.; Frank I. Schechter, Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 831 
(1927). 
236 See GHOSH ET AL., supra note 234, at 537. 
237 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1125(c), 1127) [hereinafter FTDA]. 
238 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006). 
239 See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:104 
(4th ed. 1996) (explaining the concept of "fame" in the context of dilution doctrine). 
240 See FTDA, supra note 237, § 1125(c)(1). 
241 See MCCARTHY, supra note 239. 
242 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2006). 
243 See MCCARTHY, supra note 239. 
244 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(B) (2006). 
245 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(C) (2006). 
246 See, e.g., Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 
191 F.3d 208, 217–22 (2d Cir. 1999) (blurring); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. 
Supp. 2d 727, 733 (D. Minn. 1998) (tarnishment); Jonathan Mermin, Interpreting the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Action of 1995: The Logic of the Actual Dilution Requirement, 42 B.C. L. REV. 207, 220 (2000). 
247 Courts in different jurisdictions developed different tests to meet actual dilution standard.  See 
sources cited supra note 246. 
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dilution.”248  Thus, the owner of a famous mark may be able to stop the dilution use of its 
mark without proffering evidence of “actual association.”249 
¶79 Second, sound public policy reasons preclude dilution protection to general marks.  
As J. Thomas McCarthy succinctly put it: 
Without a requirement that the plaintiff’s mark be very strong and famous, an 
antidilution statute becomes a rogue law that turns every trademark, no matter 
how weak, into an anticompetitive weapon.  If every trademark could invoke the 
antidilution remedy and stop uses of all similar marks in every market and every 
line of trade, this would upset the traditional balance of fair versus free 
competition that is inherent in trademark law.  Such an expansion of the 
antidilution theory would grant every trademark a right “in gross,” contrary to the 
most basic concepts of what legal rights of exclusion should exist in a 
trademark.250 
Because of policy concerns, dilution law in the United States is not without its 
controversies.  On the one hand, proponents of dilution protection posit that rights-
holders are entitled to protect “their investment in the selling power of their mark”251 in 
the absence of consumer confusion.252  Opponents, on the other hand, aver that dilution 
law bestows upon trademark owners too much exclusivity in a property right without 
clear boundaries.253 
¶80 In view of the policy concerns, legislative history of federal dilution laws and the 
TDRA all contemplate that “rigorous” standards be applied to label a mark “famous” 
before granting the “sweeping scope of exclusivity . . . .”254  Further, legislative history 
also shows that the “dilution remedy was an ‘extraordinary’ one” conditioned upon a 
“clear showing of fame.”255  As such, the rigorous “fame” test under the TDRA was 
intended as a “potent filter,” qualifying “only truly prominent and renowned marks” for 
dilution protection.256  Therefore, “fame,” in the context of dilution, is a distinct concept 
from its counterpart in a likelihood-of-confusion setting.257  On the same topic, the 
Federal Circuit eloquently summed it up: “While dilution fame is an either/or 
proposition—fame either does or does not exist—likelihood of confusion fame varies 
among a spectrum from very strong to very weak.”258 
 
248 See GHOSH ET AL., supra note 234, at 541 n.2. 
249 See James H. Johnson & Deidre A. Francis, 2007 Stands as a Crucial Year for Trademark Law, 
NAT’L L.J., Jan. 21, 2008, at S1. 
250 See MCCARTHY, supra note 239. 
251 See Mermin, supra note 246, at 208. 
252 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1295 and H.R. 1270 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) 
(testimony of Nils Victor Montan, Vice President, Senior Intellectual Property Counsel, Warner Bros.). 
253 See Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute 
Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 448–49 (1994); see also Mermin, supra note 246, at 208. 




258 See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondée En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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¶81 The end result of dilution laws in the United States is a grant of sweeping, 
extensive, and extraordinary remedies to a mark that is truly prominent with wide 
consumer recognition.  In short, J. Thomas McCarthy characterized this kind of deserving 
mark as “a household name.”259 
2. Anti-Dilution in China Is in Its Infancy 
¶82 Dilution law in China currently remains largely an academic topic.  Aside from 
international IP treaties, most countries in the world establish a minimum set of IP laws 
and rules relative to foreign IP.  This is because IP rights are territorial in nature, 
enforceable only in the jurisdiction where the rights originated.260  There is no 
international treaty binding China to provide dilution protection to foreign marks, and the 
CTL and its corresponding regulations do not contain statutory language on dilution.  
Nonetheless, this absence of a statutory provision has not precluded scholarly discussion 
on the need for dilution law in China.  Quite on the contrary, Chinese IP judges and 
scholars have been contemplating the shape, form, and boundaries of dilution law in 
China since 2003.261  The SPC issued a guidance opinion suggesting that a registered 
well-known mark warranted dilution protection if infringement would lead to objective 
dilution of the mark and if the infringer was a competitor of the rights-holder.262  The 
guidance opinion was in response to a decision by the Hubei Higher People’s Court, 
which held the defendant liable for trademark infringement and unfair competition.  The 
court reasoned that defendant’s use of “DuPont” caused consumer confusion as to the 
source of the goods in question and that such use resulted in “actual dilution” of the well-
known mark “DuPont.”263  Justice Xia Junli of the SPC, however, doubts the necessity of 
the application of dilution in the DuPont case.264 
¶83 Many Chinese scholars have openly suggested writing dilution protection into 
amendments of the CTL.  Notably, the Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court IP Task 
Group (“IP Task Group”) recommended granting “absolute protection” to “widely 
recognized and highly reputable” registered marks, thereby extending exclusive rights to 
“all” goods and services.265  Professor Deng Hongguang incisively pointed out that, even 
though the current CTL strengthened protection for well-known marks in accordance 
with the TRIPs Agreement, it lacks relevant provisions on dilution; therefore, it is likely 
that fierce debates will ensue regarding how dilution should be incorporated into the 
 
259 MCCARTHY, supra note 239. 
260 See Elizabeth Chien-Hale, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 2007: RESOLVING THE CHALLENGES OF 
TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT 190 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1626, 2007). 
261 See Xia Junli, Guan yu chi ming shang biao si fa bao hu jia zhi qu xiang ji zhi du she zhi de si kao 
[Contemplations on the Valuation Orientation and System Establishment with Respect to the Judicial 
Protection of Well-Known Marks], 12 LAW APPLICATION (2007), available at http://law.law-
star.com/txtcac/lwk/047/lwk047s417.txt.htm. 
262 Id. 
263 See Lishi Int’l, Ltd. v. Wuhan DuPont Paint, Ltd. (Hubei Province Higher People’s Ct., Jan. 13, 
2003), available at http://fsou.com/html/text/fnl/1174496/117449667_3.html. 
264 See Xia Junli, supra note 261. 
265 See Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court IP Task Group, Chi min shang biao si fa bao hu zhong 
cun zai de wen ti ji jie jue dui ce [Existing Issues in and Solutions for Judicial Protection of Well-Known 
Marks], CHINA IP NEWS (Oct. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.cta315.com/fa_gui_vewe.asp?infor_id=9290&class1_id=13 [hereinafter IP Task Group 
Report]. 
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Chinese jurisprudence in the next round of amendments to the CTL.266  He further argued 
that the Chinese trademark amendment committee should consider the rational basis of 
dilution law and that it should specifically provide for it by referring to relevant laws in 
the United States and the European Union.267 
3. Is China Ready for Dilution Law? 
¶84 The questions remains: Is China ready for anti-dilution law?  If so, what legal 
standard should guard against the potential of anticompetitive misuse by rights-holders?  
These questions are in the forefront of debates and deliberations surrounding the 
amendments of the CTL.  Proponents of anti-dilution law who look to the United States 
and the European Union acknowledge that dilution law is a powerful tool in protecting 
well-known marks.268  However, views diverge on the timing of the official adoption and 
advent of dilution law in China.  Some advocate its adoption in the amendments of the 
CTL;269 others would condition dilution protection on further economic development and 
progress in China since an immediate adoption benefits mostly foreign marks and would 
“bind the hands and feet of Chinese companies.”270  Still others believe that sorting out 
the existing problems in China’s well-known marks with respect to “confusion” is a 
condition precedent to the introduction of dilution law.271  Yet another scholar posits that 
anti-dilution falls into the sphere of the Law Against Unfair Competition.  Since dilution 
of trademarks in its very essence is unfair competition, it is the Law Against Unfair 
Competition, not the CTL, that should be amended with respect to dilution.272  Chinese 
scholars, courts, and policymakers have apparently not, as of yet, reached a consensus on 
China’s readiness for dilution law. 
C. Unifying the Standards Across the Country for Recognizing Well-Known Marks 
¶85 The lack of uniformity of standards in determining well-known marks as applied in 
courts plagues China’s current well-known mark scene.  The report of the IP Task Group 
makes it clear that inconsistency of standards utilized to recognize well-known marks is 
remarkable throughout courts in China.273  In some regions, more than eighty percent of 
marks in question were recognized as such for infringement/consumer confusion 
purposes, whereas less than thirty percent were recognized as well-known by Beijing 
 
266 See Deng Hongguang, Wo guo shang biao fan dan hua de xian shi yu li xiang [The Reality and Ideal 
in China’s Trademark Anti-Dilution Law], 5 ELECTRONICS INTELL. PROP., 2007, available at 
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=42041. 
267 Id. 
268 See id.; Chen Shaoping, Shi lun chi ming shang biau dan hua li lun: Jian ping wo quo fan bu dang 
jing zheng fa di wu tiao di er xiang de gui ding [On the Theoretic Underpinnings of the Dilution of Well-
Known Marks: China’s Anti-Unfair Competition Law Article Five (2)], CHINALAWINFO, 2005, available at 
http://www.fsou.com/html/text/art/3355729/335572972_2.html. 
269 See American Bar Association Joint Sections Task Force, Comments of the ABA Joint Sections on the 
Proposed Amendments to the Chinese Trademark Law Dated Aug. 30, 2007 (on file with author); IP Task 
Group Report, supra note 265. 
270 See Deng Hongguang, supra note 266. 
271 See Xia Junli, supra note 261; see also IP Task Group Report, supra note 265. 
272 See Chen Shaoping, supra note 268. 
273 See IP Task Group Report, supra note 265. 
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courts in the same time period.274  Consequently, varying standards have led to forum-
shopping by mark owners in order to obtain well-known mark protection and status for 
their marks.275 
¶86 Well-known mark law has been misunderstood and misused in China as well.  
Some litigants even initiated lawsuits for the sole purpose of obtaining the coveted “well-
known” label for their marks, so as to achieve economic gain.276  This widespread 
practice, often spurred on by local governments, reveals a commonplace misconception 
of the very nature of “well-known” mark, in that somehow a well-known mark embodies 
an “independent right,”277 rather than its original intended legal meaning—broader 
protection in case of infringement.278  Therefore, well-known mark litigation in China has 
been used as an end to achieve the “well-known” mark status, instead of the means to 
enforce IP rights.279 
¶87 In the wake of these pervasive problems, fast changes must emerge.  Some 
commentators call for more detailed standards,280 either from the SPC (the judiciary) or 
the amendments of the CTL (the legislature), because CTL’s current practice for 
determining well-known marks is problematic.  Others, however, argue that there is 
not—and should not be—a single uniform standard for well-known marks since the scope 
of “well-knownness” is contingent upon the relevant distinctiveness, similarity of the 
types of goods and services in question, and the geographic scope of consumers as it 
relates to the mark.281  Hence, the solution lies not in making more rules, but in a better 
understanding and application of the existing standards, especially in careful analysis of 
particular facts of each case282 and in countering the misuse and abuse of well-known 
mark protection system in China by rights-holders.283  To effectively counter the 
systematic abuse of the institutional structure of well-known mark protection, some 
suggest that policymakers must look to procedural improvements, such as “outsourcing” 
the determination of well-known marks to arbitration or specialized private trademark 
institutions.284  Scholars also contend that people’s courts must scrutinize the purposes of 
well-known mark litigations and evidence proffered in support of marks under dispute.285  
And it has also been suggested that jurisdiction over the determination of well-known 




276 See Xia Junli, supra note 261. 
277 Id. 
278 See IP Task Group Report, supra note 265. 
279 See Xia Junli, supra note 261. 
280 See IP Task Group Report, supra note 265. 







N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 9  
 
VI. NEW IMPETUS FOR CHANGE 
¶88 Since China presently stands at a historical threshold in many aspects, it must move 
forward with comprehensive transformation of its trademark protection system.  Progress 
in IP laws, trademark law in this case, is in China’s best interest for a host of reasons.  As 
China transitions into the Third Phase of IPR protection,287 it needs to adopt a 
comprehensive well-known mark protection regime that is beneficial to both Chinese and 
foreign rights-holders.  In fact, China’s domestic environment (Guoqing) necessitates 
amending the CTL to heighten its fundamental role as a tool to protect private property 
rights, while at the same time diminish its administrative functions.  Moreover, the time 
is ripe for adopting anti-dilution provisions to afford greater protection to truly well-
known marks.  In support of these assertions, the following section outlines why China 
has new impetus for adopting these changes into the CTL. 
A. Economic Impetus for Change 
¶89 To develop and sustain a knowledge-based, technology-based economy, China 
needs to protect sectors of the economy whose market competitiveness and sustainability 
depends on a reliable, predictable, and fair IP legal structure.  Protection of IPR has been 
“an integral part of China’s economic reform policy,” 288 and China should continue this 
macro policy at the same time it undertakes micro “surgical” procedures to improve its IP 
law, such as its laws on the protection of well-known marks. 
¶90 In recent years, the Chinese government has taken initiatives to spur economic 
growth through technology, innovation, and brand-name building.  It has encouraged 
companies to grow through scientific research and technological innovation.289  The 
government has also been pushing Chinese companies to build global brands290 because 
weak branding by Chinese exports has forked large portions of profits to importers, 
leaving exporters with minimum returns.291  Many Chinese corporations have responded 
to the call and tried to build global brands by purchasing western brands, such as the 
successful takeover of IBM’s personal computer brands by the Chinese company 
Legend292 and CNOOC’s failed bid for Unocal.293  In addition, some Chinese brand 
names have gradually gained international renown, such as electronics giant Haier, oil 
companies PetroChina and Sinopec, and telecommunications multinational corporation 
Huawei.  Furthermore, in 2006, a staggering 700,000 trademark applications were filed 
with the China Trademark Office.294  These trends suggest that more Chinese are 
conscious of the value of well-known brands and the rights associated with trademarks. 
 
287 See Ruixue Ran, supra note 6, at 245. 
288 Lehman et al., supra note 12, at 257. 
289 See Wall, supra note 5, at 355. 
290 Id. at 356. 
291 Id. at 356–57. 
292 See BBC News, Chinese Firm Buys IBM PC Business, (Dec. 8, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4077579.stm.  Legend has since changed its name to Lenovo. 
293 See David Barboza, China Backs Away from Unocal Bid, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 3, 2005, 
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/02/business/unocal.php. 
294 See Yang Yexuan, supra note 225. 
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¶91 As the Chinese economy continues its record-setting rate of growth,295 Chinese 
brands are exposed to infringement in foreign countries.  In order to indirectly protect 
Chinese brands overseas, China needs to strengthen its own IP protection.  Based on the 
latest report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, China’s 
outbound Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) grew to US $90.6 billion by the end of 
2006.296  However, what is unknown by many is that “since the 1980s more than 2,000 
trademarks of exported Chinese goods had been registered overseas, which has caused 
losses of intangible assets in the amount of RMB 1 billion every year.”297  Affording 
legitimately well-known Chinese marks better protection in China, as it did for the 
Chinese mark “Butterfly” (a sewing machine brand) in 1991 to stop squatting by an 
infringer in Indonesia,298 will likely help them grow in international markets.  While 
strong domestic trademark protection is not a sufficient condition for fostering well-
known Chinese brands, it could be a necessary condition as evidenced by the formation 
of a multiplicity of Western well-known marks. 
¶92 Growth of FDI in China remains spectacular in size.299  In a coordinated effort to 
encourage more technology-driven investments and discourage labor-intensive 
manufacturing investments, China has revised its tax code,300 its import-export 
regulations,301 and its investment laws.302  It is in China’s best interest to give strong 
protection to prospective investors, whose most valuable assets are in IP, since such a 
move would alleviate qualms about China’s commitment to IPR protection.  Despite 
conflicting research on the causal relationship between IP law and FDI,303 stronger 
trademark laws serve China’s interest in building a knowledge-based economy and 
 
295 See Richard McGregor, China Growth up to 11.4% Amid Inflation Fear, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 
24, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/85612f72-ca9c-11dc-a960-000077b07658.html. 
296 Secretariat of the Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Investment Committee, China’s 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment (Feb., 2008) (unpublished draft report, on file with the author). 
297 See China Piracy Reports, “Wang Zhi He” Wins Trial in Germany (Oct. 16, 2007), 
http://chinapiracyreports.com/2008/02/05/wang-zhi-he-trial-wins-in-germany.aspx. 
298 See An Qinghu, supra note 24, at 709. 
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http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2008-01/22/content_6411643.htm. 
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2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-03/19/content_554243.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 
2008) (P.R.C.) (law unifies China’s tax rates for foreign and domestic corporations at 25% and provides tax 
incentives for corporations that invest in high-tech and environmentally friendly sectors). 
301 Promulgating List of Commodity Restricted for Processing Trade (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Gen. Admin. of Customs, July 26, 2007, effective Aug. 23, 2007) 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/200707/20070704928458.html (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2008) (P.R.C.).  China changed its export policies and rules to “curb exports of cheap labor-
intensive, low-value-added products to force manufacturers into making higher-quality goods, in a move to 
narrow the world’s largest trade surplus and reduce environmental damage.” Li Yanping, China to Limit 
Exports of Labor-Intensive Products, BLOOMBERG.COM, July 25, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&refer=asia&sid=a9c64IDUkhpo. 
302 See Guiding Catalogue of Foreign-Invested Industries (2007) (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Commerce and the Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n, Oct. 31, 2007, effective Dec. 1, 2007) ISINOLAW (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2009) (P.R.C.).  Adopted amendments continue to encourage FDI in high-tech investments 
and encourage investments in renewal energy sectors; but FDI in conventional manufacturing where China 
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303 See Yahong Li, The Wolf Has Come: Are China’s Intellectual Property Industries Prepared for the 
WTO?, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 77, 79–81 (2002). 
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continue to attract FDI.  After all, it is unlikely that stronger IP protection would, by 
itself, reduce FDI flowing into China. 
B. Political Impetus for Change 
¶93 Excessive administrative discretion has been blamed for the lax IPR enforcement in 
China.304  A revised CTL, lessening the authorities of administrative agencies granted 
therein, would therefore contribute to China’s ruling party’s overall goal305 of 
establishing the rule of law.  Diagnosis for the deficient enforcement of Chinese IP laws 
has often pointed the blame toward “discretion” in the hands of the enforcers,306 as 
“China remains more a system of discretion supplemented by law than a system of law 
supplemented by discretion.”307  In other words, in China the “rule of man” dominates the 
law.  Even though some attribute the excessive abuse of discretion by Chinese officials to 
China’s one-party political system,308 the realistic solution at this point lies not in a 
complete change of China’s current political system.  Rather, the solution lies in the 
removal of excessive administrative functions of the CTL, thus reducing the discretion in 
the hands of trademark administrators.  Therefore, reducing the administrative function of 
the CTL achieves the twin purposes of enhancing the private property nature of 
trademarks and removal of administrative discretion.  And that represents a step toward 
the rule of law, and a step away from the rule of man. 
 
C. Legislative Impetus for Change 
¶94 Cognizant of the urgent need to accelerate comprehensive IP legislations, the 
Chinese government must recognize the need to enact laws consistent with other non-IP 
laws.  According to China’s ambitious 2007 Action Plan on IPR Protection, Chinese 
lawmakers were expected to “finalize the draft amendment,” to continue improving anti-
unfair competition laws, and to “speed up revision to the Provisions for Identification and 
Protection of Well-Known Trademarks.”309  To adopt amendments without a drastic 
change of view on the very purpose of the CTL—namely a balance between protecting 
private rights and the public—is to make haste while ignoring root causes of lax 
enforcement of trademark rights in China.  In addition, if China is to build a knowledge-
based economy and attract more technology-driven investments, it cannot promise IPR 
protection on the one hand and hesitate to enact laws that provide strong IPR protection 
on the other. 
¶95 Furthermore, adopting amendments to the CTL with strong protection for well-
known marks would work in tandem with existing laws.  In 2007, after fourteen years of 
304 See Stacy H. Wang, Great Olympics, New China: Intellectual Property Enforcement Steps up to the 
Mark, 27 LOY. L. A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 294–95 (2005). 
305 See WHITE PAPER: CHINA EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW 1 (2008), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-02/28/content_7687418_1.htm. 
306 See Wang, supra note 304, at 302. 
307 Id. at 294 (citing Margret Y.K.Woo, Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts, 8 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 581, 615 (1999)). 
308 See id. at 294–95. 
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internal political debates, China adopted its landmark Private Property Law,310 
establishing concrete legal processes for its citizens to assert rights over private real 
property.311  Amendments to the CTL further recognizing the private rights associated 
with trademarks would be a perfect follow-up and affirmation of the Private Property 
Law.  Concerns about the anticompetitive side effect of adopting anti-dilution provisions 
to the CTL could dissolve if such protection accompanies only truly prominent and 
reputable marks, as the courts have done so in the United States.312  With respect to 
anticompetitive behaviors in the market, China has already enacted its first 
comprehensive Anti-Monopoly Law,313 which specifically prohibits monopolistic 
practices with respect to IPR.314  Therefore, from a legislative standpoint, adopting the 
desired changes to the CTL complements existing laws. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
¶96 Contrary to ill-informed opinions, rights-holders of well-known marks do have 
protection under the Chinese trademark law system.  The current CTL explicitly provides 
for protection of well-known marks, either registered or unregistered in China.  Broad 
protection for well-known marks extends to prohibition against registration, use in 
commerce, and “cybersquatting.”  In addition to these broad statutory rights under the 
CTL, rights-holders can enforce their rights in China’s established trademark institutional 
structure.  Various means, including administrative and judicial approaches, are available 
to enforce rights associated with well-known marks.  This institutional structure for 
trademark protection evolved over a course of decades in China in the unique context of 
China’s political, economic and legislative background, and the progress continues as 
China embarks on another round of amendments to the current CTL. 
¶97 In the course of amending the current CTL, difficult issues must be dealt with to 
further solidify and strengthen well-known mark protection in China.  For example, as 
debates continue with respect to the core function of trademark (administrative authority 
vs. protection of private rights) and anti-dilution provisions, China faces familiar choices 
as to whether it should adopt such drastic amendments.  The authors of this note advocate 
that China’s local conditions, economic, political and legislative backgrounds, necessitate 
their adoption. 
310 See Wu quan fa [Private Property Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
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Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm (last 
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